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ABSTRACT

Over time, we have grown increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters.
Each decade, economic losses from such disasters more than double as people
continue to build homes, businesses, and other physical infrastructure in
hazardous places. Yet public policy has thus far failed to address the unique
problems posed by natural disasters. This Article takes a first step toward
improving public policy by offering a paradigm for understanding its failures,
suggesting that three categories of obstacles obstruct sensible government
regulation.
Drawing from philosophy, cognitive psychology, history, anthropology,
and political science, this Article identifies and analyzes three categories of
obstacles to disaster policy-symbolic obstacles, cognitive obstacles, and
structural obstacles. The way we talk about natural disaster, the way we think
about the risks of building in hazardous places, and structural aspects of
American political institutions all favor development over restraint. Indeed,
these forces have such strength that in most circumstances society automatically

* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Federico Cheever, Brigham Daniels, john Echeverria, Nancy Leong, justin Marceau, Peter Byrne,
Michael Wara, and Annecoos Wiersema for their thoughtful comments. I would also like to
thank Elizabeth Hutchinson and Courtney Mcvean for their outstanding work as my research
assistants.

213

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

and thoughtlessly responds to natural disasters by beginning to rebuild as soon
as a disaster has occurred.
The types of obstacles discussed in this Article interact and amplify one
another, further impeding policymaking. The history of disaster policy suggests
that efforts to respond to any one obstacle will likely fail. Only by
understanding these obstacles collectively, and by coordinating responses to
their individual and cumulative effects, can America effectively tackle the
natural disaster problems it faces.
I. INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy swept through the
northeastern United States. Coastal communities experienced a
record-setting storm surge that reached more than thirteen feet. 1
Waves topped thirty feet outside of New York Harbor and grew to
almost forty feet in Atlantic City, New Jersey. 2 In all, parts of seven
states received more than five inches of rain during the storm's
course. 3 This rare event swept through many of the same areas
devastated only the year before by Hurricane Irene, 4 causing New
York Governor Andrew Cuomo to quip "we have a 100-year flood
every two years now." 5
Natural disasters are a recurring feature of the American
experience. In 2011 there were ninety-nine federally declared, major
natural disasters in the United States. 6 They came in all shapes and

1. National Hurricane Ctr., Post-Tropical Cyclone SANDY Update Statement (Oct. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/refresh/MIATCUAT3 +shtml! 292256.shtml.
2. See The Stats Are in: Superstorm Sandy Totals, ACCUWEATHER.COM (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/sandy-statistics-rain-wind-snow/876665;
National Hurricane Ctr., Post-Tropical Cyclone SANDY Update Statement (Oct. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/text/refresh/MIATCUAT3 + shtml/292256.shtml.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., David Ariosto, First Irene, Then Sandy: jersey City Recovers, Again, CNN WIRE
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/us/new-jersey-irene-sandy/.
5. Jimmy Vielkind, Cuomo: Need to Rebuild for 'New Reality', CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (Oct.
31,
20 12),
http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/162627/cuomo-we-need-to-planrebuild-for-new-reality.
6. See Natural Disasters: Counting the Cost of Calamities, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012, at 60.
The year 2011 was a record year for disasters, but other years are not far behind. There were, for
example, seventy-eight disaster declarations in 2004. See E.L. Quarantelli, et a!., A Heuristic
Approach to Future Disasters and Crises: New, Old, and In-Between Types, in HANDBOOK OF DISASTER
RESEARCH 16, 35 (Havian Rodriguez, et a!., eds. 2006). By some estimates, more than 200
natural catastrophes occur each year around the globe. Id. at 18.
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sizes: wildfires, floods, blizzards, hurricanes, and earthquakes. 7
Hurricane Irene is a good example, tearing through New England at
the end of August 2011. In the wake of the storm, streams and rivers
flooded, destroying homes, businesses, and roads, and causing over
$15 billion in damage. 8 Hurricane Irene, like the other ninety-eight
major disasters of 2011, 9 was a tragedy for many people. Like most
natural events that result in massive economic loss, the storm was
also a predictable, albeit rare, event. Much of the flooding that swept
away memories and livelihoods occurred in areas predicted to flood,
on average, once every hundred years. 10 But, as Governor Cuomo
recognized, such floods sometimes strike in rapid succession. 11
These events are referred to as "natural" disasters because they
are precipitated by natural forces. But the behavior of humanswhere we locate and how we build our homes, businesses, and
roads-plays a leading role in transforming events into disasters. 12

7. See Natural Disasters: Counting the Cost of Calamities, supra note 6 at 60; Storm Leaves Trail
of Snow, Ice, Power Outages, Freezing Temperatures, ABC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012 3:23 PM),
http:/I abcnews.go.com/US/blizzard-20 11-mega-snowstorm-pounds-midwest-snowice/story?id = 12818948#. UJAK12125V g.
8. Costliest U.S. Hurricanes, WUNDERGROUND (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:43PM), http://www.wund
erground.com/hurricane/damage.asp. By the time Hurricane Irene reached New England, its
winds had slowed enough that it had become a tropical storm. See Marc Santora, High and Dry?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at Section RE. This Article refers to the storm in total as "Hurricane
Irene" to avoid confusion.
9. Disaster Declarations by Year, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012).
10. See, e.g., Jeff Masters, Irene's 1-in-100 Year Rains Trigger Deadly Flooding, WUNDERBLOG
(Aug. 29, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?
entrynum= 1908.
11. Repeated flooding in hundred-year-flood plains can occur for one of two reasons.
First, as a matter of pure probability, the chances of such flooding occurring in consecutive years
is one in one thousand, reasonable odds in light of the extensive network of floodplains that
occur in the United States. See, e.g., Mark Crowell, eta!., An Estimate of the U.S. Population Living in
100-Year Coastal Flood Hazard Areas, 26]. CoASTAL RES. 201, 208 (2010) (estimating that more
than eight million people live in areas subject to a one-percent risk of coastal flooding). Second,
estimates of the likelihood of flooding may quickly become out of date as new development
increases flood risk. See infra note 26.
12. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 3 (2d ed. 2010). As Daniel
Farber and his colleagues have explained, "[M]ost serious students of disaster have moved from
defining a disaster as the hazardous event itself to defining a disaster in terms of the impact that
the hazardous event has on people and property-an impact that is determined not only by the
magnitude of the event, but also by human interaction with nature, by our choices about where
and how we live." Id. Recognizing the responsibility of human decision making, some have
proposed that the term "nature-induced disaster" more accurately captures the phenomenon. See
Christian Pfister, Learning from Nature-Induced Disasters, Theoretical Considerations and Case Studies
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Hurricane Irene's rain may have caused rivers and streams to overtop
their banks, but a flood only becomes a disaster if human
infrastructure lies in its path. 13 Indeed, the armoring of rivers,
hardening of floodplains, and development of watersheds increases
the severity of the flood itself. In a very real sense, the strength of
Hurricane Irene, at least as people experienced it, was the result of
policies that facilitated and permitted development in floodplains.
Natural disasters are, then, significantly a function of the built
environment, rather than stochastic natural forces.
Scholars have long recognized the role humans play in
transforming natural events into natural disasters. As Phil O'Keefe
and his colleagues wrote in a 1976 path-breaking article in the
journal Nature, "[w]ithout people there is no disaster." 14 O'Keefe
recognized the profundity of this realization and argued that "[t]he
time is ripe for some form of precautionary planning which considers
vulnerability of the population as the real cause of disaster-a
vulnerability that is induced by socio-economic conditions that can
be modified by man, and is not just an act of God." 15
Unfortunately, in the thirty-five years since, society has done a
poor job accounting for its starring role in the genesis of natural
disaster. There have been repeated calls for reform. 16 Most recently,
a joint committee of the National Academies of Sciences, the
National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine
released a report entitled "Disaster Resilience: A National
Imperative," reiterating the importance and urgency of reducing the
nation's vulnerability to natural disasters. 17 Notwithstanding this

from Western Europe, in NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES, 17, 18 (Christof Mauch &
Christian Pfister eds., 2009). This Article uses the familiar nomenclature because of its widespread adoption.

13. See, e.g., Christo[ Mauch, Introduction to NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES,
supra note 12, at 4 (explaining that natural disasters "should be understood as both physical
events and social or cultural occurrences").
14. Phil O'Keefe et al., Taking the Naturalness Out of Natural Disasters, 260 NATURE 566, 566
(1976).
15. !d. at 567.
16. DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (1999) (arguing that in light of sustained failure to reduce losses from disaster
"the nation must shift to a policy of 'sustainable hazard mitigation'").
17. THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, DISASTER RESILIENCE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE vii (2012)
(arguing that the nation should "embark on a new path-one that .
. recognizes and rewards
the values of resilience to the individual, household, community, and the nation"). Notably,
many of the policy prescriptions advocated for by those concerned with disaster policy remain
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sustained concern with disaster vulnerability, development continues
at an explosive pace in areas of extreme hazard. Florida, for example,
a state facing hurricane risk so severe that private insurance
companies have largely refused to issue policies covering wind
damage, has also experienced one of the highest growth rates in the
country. 18 Within Florida, development is concentrated in counties
facing particularly acute hurricane risks. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration estimates that St. Lucie County will be
struck by a hurricane an average of once every eight years and a
major hurricane an average of once every nineteen years. 19 Yet the
population in St. Lucie County increased by more than forty percent
between 2000 and 2010, as did the number of housing units. 20 The
same is true of development subject to other natural hazards. Living
along the boundary between urban areas and wild lands has become
increasingly popular, despite the high risk posed by wildfire. The
Department of Agriculture predicts that by 2030 more than 2.2
million homes will be located at the fire-prone, wildness-urban

relatively constant. These strategies include implementation of stronger building codes, better
land-use planning through local zoning decisions to channel development away from hazardprone areas, and use of insurance instruments to better price risk. See id. at 179-180, 182-83;
MILETI, supra note 16, at 155-74.
18. See, e.g., juSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL
WARMING: THE CASE FOR RELYING ON THE PRIVATE MARKET 8, 11 (2007) (identifying decisions by
insurance companies to stop providing insurance in certain hurricane-prone areas, including
Florida); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of LargeScale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1810 (2006)
(explaining that in the wake of the 2004-2005 hurricane season "insurers and reinsurers are
reexamining their ability to provide protection against wind damage from hurricanes and are
asking whether these events are insurable, and if so, at what price"); see also Julie Patel, State
Farm Dumps Policies into Citizens, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 19,2011 (describing growth in number of
state-backed wind insurance policies as largest private insurer in Florida shed coverage).
19. See Return Period Hurricane, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/images/return _hurr.
jpg (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); Return Period Major Hurricane, http://www.nhc.noaa.
gov/climo/images/return_mjrhurr.jpg (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). This information about
direct strikes underestimates risks to development because it does not include indirect strikes or
tropical storms.
20. According to the 2000 census, there were 192,695 people and 91,262 housing units in
St. Lucie County. The 2010 census reports 277,789 people and 137,029 housing units. See U.S.
CENSUS, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (select
"Geographies" button; then select "County" from drop down menu; then select "florida;" then
select "St. Lucie County;" then select the "Population" link; to change census years select the
"Topics" link).
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interface in the Rocky Mountains, a forty percent increase from
2006. 21
In light of abundant documentation of the risk of building in
areas subject to natural hazards and repeated calls for reform, why
do we remain on a reckless course that places more people,
buildings, and infrastructure in harm's way? This Article takes up
that important question, identifying three categories of obstacles
that impede the adoption of thoughtful, proactive policies to guide
development in hazardous areas. These categories-symbolic,
cognitive, and structural-reinforce one another, collectively causing
society to make bad decisions both before disaster strikes and in its
wake.
In discussing these obstacles, I do not write on an entirely blank
slate. Others have considered patterns of thinking and structures of
government that impede disaster policy. 22 But this Article's
comprehensive and structured approach offers important lessons for
those seeking to enact reform. It offers the critical insight that
symbolic, cognitive, and structural obstacles reinforce one another,
and, moreover, explains how this cumulative effect occurs. So, for
example, the symbolic importance attached to reconstruction in the
wake of disaster may reinforce cognitive mechanisms that distort
perceptions of risk. In turn, these cognitive mechanisms may amplify
policy distortions created by structural aspects of the government
entities charged with formulating disaster policy. As a result,
creating regulation that embodies a sustained commitment to reduce
vulnerability to natural disaster is likely to succeed only if it is
supported by policies that account for all three of the obstacles
identified here and their interactions.
In light of this reality, better understanding the obstacles facing
disaster policy will enable society to respond to natural hazards more
appropriately. Each type of obstacle lends itself to different
responses. Symbolic obstacles generally require a discursive remedy.

21. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., WESTERN REGION, AUDIT REPORT:
FOREST SERVICE LARGE FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS, Rep. No. 08601-44-SF, at 6 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Raymond]. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL.
& Soc. Sci. 171, 173-81 (2006) [hereinafter Burby, Paradoxes] (arguing that natural disaster
policy suffers from a "safe development paradox" and a "local government paradox"); Howard
Kunreuthcr & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 ].
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6-7 (2004) (contending that limited information, transaction costs, and
assumptions that low-level risks will not occur lead to underinsurance).
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Cognitive obstacles require debiasing strategies to correct for
systematic errors of cognition. Finally, structural obstacles require
redesigning political institutions responsible for disaster policy. A
comprehensive policy that harnesses multiple strategies to address
all three obstacles is most likely to result in a successful and
sustained effort to reduce vulnerability to natural disaster.
Existing approaches to disaster policy have failed, at least in part,
because they have failed to account for all three obstacles and the
interaction among them. Consider, for example, the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), which requires communities to impose
standards for new construction within one-hundred-year floodplains
to enable their residents to purchase insurance. 23 Theoretically, the
NFIP should lead to better development practices by pricing hazard
risk. In reality, the NFIP has been a colossal failure, significantly
increasing development in floodplains and resulting in staggering
losses that must be paid by the federal treasury. 24 Critics of the NFIP
have long blamed subsidized insurance premiums as largely
responsible for this failure, 25 and there is little doubt that the
practice of underpricing risk has encouraged development. 26 But the
NFIP also does little to address structural obstacles to effective
disaster policy. 27 Nor has the NFIP shifted the discourse

23. See, e.g., 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c) (2) (requiring local governments to restrict new
development in certain designated floodplains such that the "lowest floor (including basement)
[is] elevated to or above the base flood level"); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL
ISSUES, GA0-10-1063T, at 4 (2010) [hereinafter NFIP ACTIONS NEEDED] (providing background
on NFIP).
24. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 14-17; Raymond]. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain
Management: The US Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS Ill, 116-17 (200 I).
25. See Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual
Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2004 (arguing that through
provision of "artificial insurance rates," the federal government is "complicit[]" in "exacerbating
disaster risks"); NFIP ACTIONS NEEDED, supra note 23, at 6 ("[T]he number of policies receiving
subsidized rates has grown steadily in recent years and without changes to the program will
likely continue to grow, increasing the potential for future NFIP operating deficits.").
26. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 14-15. The federal government's failure to keep flood
maps up-to-date has also caused problems for the program. See RAWLE 0. KING, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND
FINANCIAL STATUS 12-13 (2011) ("FEMA has been criticized by community officials and
property owners with respect to flood-control infrastructure protection and its risk mapping
process."); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA's RATE-SETTING PROCESS
WARRANTS ATTENTION, GA0-09-12, at 3 (2008) ("[T]he data that FEMA uses to define flood
probabilities are outdated or inaccurate.").
27. The NFIP does require local communities to adopt building code standards to reduce
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surrounding floods to address the perceived symbolic importance of
reconstruction. Indeed, the program's practice of paying out repeated
claims by the same policyholder28 enables and even encourages the
kind of constant reconstruction called for by the symbolism attached
to natural disasters and the human responses they engender.
The import of this Article is that the multifaceted, systematic
problems facing disaster policy require multifaceted, systematic
reform. This resonates with calls by other scholars for radical
rethinking of how society interacts with natural hazards. These
suggestions often seem self-evident in theory, if unthinkable in
practice. 29 Lisa Grow Sun, for example, has suggested that
communities should carefull~ consider rebuilding in hazard-prone
locations following disaster. 0 While the wisdom of this call for
introspection may be gaining some traction, 31 it has rarely carried
the day. Even as erosion has battered the highway connecting the
Outer Banks of North Carolina, requiring almost $100 million in
repairs since 1983, local leaders vehemently oppose any proposal to
remove the road as "unscientific" and "portend[ing] financial
disaster." 32 This refusal to react to natural conditions by relocating
has long been true of human societies. Between the twelfth century
and the nineteenth century, only forty-two cities worldwide were
Today,
permanently
abandoned
following
catastrophe. 33
reconstruction in the wake of disaster is virtually assured.

the damage caused by flooding but enforcement of these standards remains with the local
governments. In at least some communities, local government officials have failed to enforce, or
even understand these standards, resulting in considerable property loss. See Burby, Paradoxes,
supra note 22, at 178-79.
28. See PI DOT, supra note 18, at 15.
29. Even seemingly improbable ideas have gained traction in certain areas beset by
natural hazards. So, for example, the President of the Maldives Islands has discussed the
possibility of purchasing land in Australia to relocate the Maldivian population as the climaterelated sea level rise causes the nation to disappear. See Ben Doherty, Climate Change Castaways
Consider Move to Australia, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, jan. 7, 2012, at Section "News & Features."
30. Lisa Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the
American City, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2157 [hereinafter Sun, Smart Growth].
31. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, A Dilemma, A Promise, A Voice: After the Storm: On Flood Plain,
Pondering Wisdom of Rebuilding Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, at Al3.
32. See Cornelia Dean, A Lifeline Built on Shifting Sands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at 01
(quoting a statement by NC-20, an organization of public officials and businesspeople from
twenty waterfront counties).
33. Quarantelli eta!., supra note 6, at 21. This number reflects the abandonment of cities
following both natural- and human-caused disasters. Id. Relocation following natural disaster,
then, is rarer still.
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Even before storms strike, local governments face stiff
opposition to sensible regulation. Efforts to restrict development on
land subject to flooding every ten years, 34 or simply to require sellers
to notify potential buyers that property lies within a twenty-five-year
floodplain, consistently face stiff and often successful opposition. 35
To explain this phenomenon that places increasing numbers of
people and development dollars in harm's way, this Article proceeds
in three parts.
Part II examines symbolic obstacles to disaster policy that arise
out of language and metaphor. Natural disasters are often viewed
through the lens of a conflict in which nature is the aggressor and
humans are the victim. This metaphor is appealingly colorful and
resonates with significant public concern about terrorism and war.
And natural disaster and armed conflict share similarities in terms of
the devastation they can cause and the social resources needed in
their immediate aftermath. But the metaphor of armed conflict
burdens natural disaster response with symbolic baggage. If natural
disaster represents attack, failure to rebuild represents capitulation
and retreat. In the context of terrorism and war, it may make sense
to demonstrate that America remains steadfast, and rebuilding that
which has been destroyed serves as a symbolic victory over a
sometimes-elusive enemy. Placing people and infrastructure in the
path of natural disasters should not be viewed as a similar victory.
The cultural impetus to rebuild arising out of the armed conflict
metaphor reinforces innate cognitive processes, addressed in Part III,
which cause the human brain to systematically misperceive natural
hazard risks. Cognitive psychology has identified mechanisms that
result in erroneous risk perception, and these mechanisms, often
referred to as heuristics, cause special problems with regard to lowfrequency, high-severity risks. High-salience risks, such as the risk of
terrorist attack, tend to be magnified, but other risks, and natural
risks in particular, tend to be downplayed. As the result of a
combination of cognitive processes, natural hazards may be acutely
underappreciated. This operates directly on policymakers by shaping
their perceptions both of appropriate policies and also the relative
importance of different problems. Even where policymakers acquire
sufficient information to develop a relatively sophisticated sense of

34. County Delays Wetlands Changes, FLA. TODAY, june 3, 2010, at Bl.
35. Brian Haas, New Homes Plan Passes, BRADENTON HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002, at Cl.
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the problems posed by natural hazards in their jurisdiction, these
cognitive obstacles may shape the public appetite for restrictions on
development.
Symbolic and cognitive obstacles impede the development of
sensible disaster policy, and so too does the structure of the political
institutions charged with that policymaking. It is to these structural
obstacles that Part IV turns. Disaster policy is dispersed through all
levels of government and across landscapes. This diffusion causes
perverse incentives favoring development because governments with
primary responsibility to regulate the practices that lead to
vulnerability pay few of the costs associated with disaster and
capture few of the benefits of effective regulation. These vertical
problems-whereby the federal government pays the cost of disaster
but local governments reap the rewards of development-and
horizontal problems-whereby the policies of neighboring local
governments affect each other-favor development over regulation.
In addition, the temporal dimensions of disasters and the
relationship between their dispersed costs and the concentrated
benefits of development lead to regulatory failures.
To make these categories concrete, this Article will discuss the
experience of a range of communities in states from Florida to
California to Vermont. To illuminate the commonalities of these
examples, the Article will primarily, although not exclusively, focus
on flooding. Each type of natural hazard poses its own unique
variations on the themes discussed. For example, buildings located
in floodplains both sustain damage in floods and also increase flood
risk by substituting impermeable surfaces for naturally absorbent
ecosystems. The severity of other natural events, like earthquakes,
may be less sensitive to development. The federal government also
plays a slightly larger role in regulating flooding because it provides
flood insurance through the NFIP and requires local governments to
impose certain land-use controls in identified floodplains. 36 Despite
differences at the margin, the impediments to sound disaster policy
are largely cross-cutting.
A few months after Irene's passage, newspaperman Steven
Pappas wrote a story envisioning an optimistic future in which "the
36. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM COMMUNITY ENROLLMENT AND
ELIGIBILITY
HANDBOOK
ENR-3
(2011),
available
at
http://www.floods.org/acefiles/ documentlibrary/State_Local %20Resources%20and%20Tools/3.4_ FEMA_ 553 _ Eligi bilityH
andbook_Ol-20ll.pdf.
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evidence" of Hurricane Irene "is hard to find." 37 But the author
suggested that Vermont would do more than simply rebuild. 38 The
future would include "more intelligent river management,"
infrastructure "built to higher standards," and buildings relocated
"beyond Irene's highest flood-waters." 39 These are the right lessons
to draw from an experience like Hurricane Irene. They are important
lessons, particularly in light of the potential for climate change to
increase the number and severity of extreme weather events. 40
Moreover, they are vital lessons because of the dis,groportionate
effect natural disasters have on vulnerable populations. 1
Considering and responding to the obstacles to disaster policy
can facilitate a new paradigm that puts these lessons into practice. In
so doing, we must remain cognizant of the lives disaster policy will
inevitably impact, particularly the lives of displaced individuals. 42 A
new paradigm may require relocation of entire communities, and
this is a transition that society should facilitate, just as it has
facilitated development in harm's way. However, a new paradigm is

3 7. Steven M. Pappas, A Cultural Shift, RUTLAND HERALD, Dec. 20, 2011.
38. Id.
39. !d.
40. See Sebastian Albuja & Isabel Cavelier Adarve, Protecting People Displaced by Disasters in
the Context of Climate Change: Challenges from a Mixed Conflict/Disaster Context, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
239, 239 (201 I) ("Climate science has provided unchallenged evidence that climate change has
enhanced and will continue to enhance the frequency and intensity of natural hazards.");
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 18, at 1807 ("One of the expected effects of global
warming is an increase in hurricane intensity."); P.]. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844 (2005) (arguing that
there is a trend of increased hurricane activity since 1970). But see ]onny C.L. Chan, Letter to the
Editor, Comment on "Changes in Tropical Cyclones Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming
Environment," 311 SCIENCE 1713, 1713 (2006) (arguing that there is no demonstrated trend of
increasing hurricane activity correlated with climate change).
41. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Disaster Law and Inequality, 25 LAW & lNEQ. 297, 301 (2007)
("Disaster may rain down on all, but it only sprinkles on some, while pouring on others.");
Richard ]. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Environmental Law by Reforming
Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2007) (explaining that development in
hazard-prone areas is often used "as homes for the poor, the elderly, and racial minorities who
lack the economic, physical, and political resources necessary for effective evacuation when
catastrophe hits"). Those with the fewest resources not only disproportionately live in harm's
way, but those same communities "remain left out of the recovery and rebuilding effort."
Jonathan P. Hooks & Trisha B. Miller, The Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery Excludes Those
Most in Need, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 21, 23 (2006).
42. See Albuja & Adarve, supra note 40, at 241 (arguing that disaster relief policy "should
be guided by human rights standards"); see also id. at 243-44 (citing a UN Report that identified
a human rights obligation to prevent and mitigate "the effects of disasters").
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needed because we can no longer afford to simply build and rebuild
in a continuing cycle of destruction.
II. SYMBOLIC OBSTACLES
The language used to describe natural disasters shapes cultural
understanding of those events and affects response. Take this remark
Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin made after he travelled the state
taking stock of the damage from Hurricane Irene: "I kind of felt like I
was coming out of a war zone." 43 Or this description of New York
City in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy by Mayor Michael
Bloomberg: "To describe it as looking like pictures we have seen at
the end of World War II is not overstating it." 44 Describing the sites
of natural disasters as war zones is commonplace, 45 and this imagery
taps into a prevailing cultural framework that posits natural disaster
as an armed assault by nature on society. Couching disaster in these
terms infuses disaster response with powerful symbolism.
Rebuilding in the wake of disaster becomes an imperative. To do
otherwise would be to concede defeat. 46
There are obvious similarities between war and natural
disaster-conditions in Vermont following Hurricane Irene did
resemble those found in a war zone. 47 Flooding had caused
widespread damage to public infrastructure, houses, and
businesses. 48 The governor and other government officials toured
the state by helicopter because travel over land was impossible in
43. Terri Hallenbeck, The Chief Cheerleader, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Dec. 27, 2011, at 1A.
44. James Barron, After the Devastation, a Daunting Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 30, 2012)
http://www .nytimes.com/20 12/1 0/31/us/hurricane-sandy-barrels-region-leaving-batteredpath.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O; see also Irving Dejohn, Stormy Year: Hurricane Sandy was the
Bora's Top Story in 2012, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 27, 2012, at 33 ("Superstorm Sandy
swept through the city on October 29, with parts of southern Queens resembling postapocalyptic war zones for the weeks that followed.").
45. See, e.g., Calvin Adkins, Town Un-Common, DAILY SOUTHERNER (Tarboro, N.C.), Aug.
31, 2011, available at http:!!dailysouthemer.com!x803539061/TOWN-UN-COMMON (stating that the
site of the hurricane "looked like a war zone"); Deadly joplin Tornado Was One Year Ago,
MILWAUKEE]. SENTINEL, May 22, 2012, at C8 (describing site of Tornado as "a bombed-out city
in a war zone"); Ron Scherer, After the Snowstorm: Power Outages Mean No Heat, No Trick-or- Treating,
CHRISTIAN Scr. MONITOR, Oct. 31,2011 (stating that site of blizzard "resembles a war zone").
46. Although the armed conflict paradigm dominates discourse about disaster, natural
disasters directly affect many more people each year. See Mauch, supra note 13, at 2 (citing UN
statistics).
4 7. See Hallenbeck, supra note 43.
48. !d.
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some areas, and thousands of members of the National Guard,
dressed in camouflage and operating military vehicles, descended on
the state to aid with response. 49
However, only certain aspects of natural disasters resemble war.
Nature does not attack strategically or with malice like human foes,
and responsibility for the damage caused by natural events lies in no
small part with individuals that build in areas subject to natural
hazards and the policymakers that facilitate this activity. 50 This
section, therefore, explores the ways that reliance on the metaphor
of war may trigger a maladaptive response to natural disaster.
Metaphor plays an important part in framing social understanding
of events that transpire in the world and can play a particularly
important role in shaping popular understanding of difficult-toconceptualize scientific concepts. 51 The philosopher Kenneth Burke
defines metaphor as "a device for seeing something in terms of
something else." 52 Metaphor, then, enables transference of
understanding and insight from one conceptual arena to another, but at
the same time, metaphor can lead to distortion. In the context of
natural disaster, the metaphor of armed conflict holds powerful allure
because of the social resonance of war and because the metaphor
accords with cultural mythology that identifies nature as the perpetrator
when natural disaster occurs. Seen through the lens of war, domestic
natural disasters become an attack on the American homeland. It is no
coincidence, perhaps, that the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
charged with managing the federal response to natural disasters, is
housed within the Department ofHomeland Security. 53
49. Id.
50. As Professor Richard Lazarus put it, "Mother Nature is not humankind's enemy. Nor
is Mother Nature invariability our friend. . . . Mother Nature simply 'is.'" Lazarus, supra note
41, at 1021.
51. Kathleen Tierney et al., Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their
Consequences in Hurricane Katrina, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 57, 74-76 (2006); Esa
Valiverronen, Biodiversity and the Power of Metaphor in Environmental Discourse, 11 Sci. STUDIES 19,
19 (1998).
52. KENNETH BURKE, ON SYMBOLS AND SOCIETY 247 (1989).
53. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-09-25, FEMA: IN OR
OuT?, 6-7 (2009). Donald Ketti has insightfully examined the merging of FEMA into the
Department of Homeland Security explaining that reorganizing the federal bureaucracy in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina gave politicians the chance to "declare victory as soon as the ink of
the president's signature is dry." Donald F. Ketti, Is the Worst Yet to Come?, 604 ANNALS AM.
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I am not the first to suggest that language and mythology shape
perceptions of disaster policy. Frederick Bates and Walter Peacock
have argued, for example, that using the single term "disaster" to
describe tragic events across multiple scales-personal, familial,
neighborhood-level,
and
societal-confuses
analysis
and
understanding of these phenomena, which often have little in
common other than the human suffering involved. 54 By extension,
Bates and Peacock's analysis may suggest that identifying natural
events, terrorist attacks, and large-scale accidents as "disasters," as is
commonly done, 55 may imply a false equivalency between the causes
of these events.
Lisa Grow Sun has examined the effect that mythology about
natural disaster has on short-term government response. 56 Professor
Sun's analysis focuses on a commonly held belief that disaster breeds
civil disorder, and she argues that media outlets play a central role in
perpetuating that belief even in the face of contrary evidence. 57 As
she explains, this error in understanding the natural disaster
narrative has "important implications for disaster law and policy,"
leading government to overemrhasize law enforcement at the
expense of humanitarian efforts. 5 This Article's aim is to examine a
related aspect of modern understandings of natural disaster thateither explicitly or implicitly-cast disaster as a conflict between

ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 273, 278 (2006).
54. See Frederick L. Bates & Walter G. Peacock, Disaster and Social Change, in SOCIOLOGY OF
DISASTERS: CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO DISASTER RESEARCH 291, 291-92 (Russell R. Dynes
eta!. eds., 1987).
55. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, supra note 17, at 1; Ketti, supra note 53, at 276
("Why did [we] fail to learn from September 11-and why are we likely to fail to learn yet again
from Katrina?"). At one time, scholars of disaster suggested distinguishing between natural
disasters and technological disasters but the distinction has not gained traction. See Quarantelli
eta!., supra note 6, at 22. Grouping "disasters" intentionally caused by human agents with those
resulting from natural events reinforces the armed conflict metaphor. In the rubric of disaster,
terrorism and hurricane are equivalent. The intuition that society should respond to each in
similar fashion is an unintended consequence of this equivalency.
56. Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131 (2011)
[hereinafter Sun, Disaster Mythology].
57. Id. at 1135-36.
58. Id. In related work, Professor Sun and Professor RonNell Anderson Jones examine the
way that blending discourse about natural disasters with that related to war and terrorism
results in government policies and practices that restrict the flow of information and limit
transparency. See Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Anderson Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, UCLA L.
REV. at 2 (forthcoming).
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humans and nature in which nature is inevitably viewed as the
aggressor.
The metaphor of natural disaster as conflict resonates with
significant cultural history. The story of the great flood, for example,
features prominently in many religions. In the Judea-Christian
tradition, the flood constitutes a manifestation of divine will sent to
scour the world of sin. 59 Importantly, historical views on natural
disasters equivocated as to whether they were agents of good or evil.
Take for example, alternate explanations of earthquakes in fifteenthcentury Egypt. Prominent Islamic intellectuals of the time recognized
two possible explanations for earthquakes. At times, earthquakes,
just as the great flood of the Bible, were viewed as a divine act
necessary to punish a sinful world. 60 At other times, earthquakes
were attributed to evil. 61 According to belief, the world balanced on
a large fish. 62 The devil would, on occasion, flatter the fish and it
would swell up with pride, shaking the world. 63 God would calm the
fish, restoring order. 64 Parallel understandings of natural disaster
have long been a feature of the Judea-Christian tradition, including a
view of natural disaster generally as divine retribution or the work of
infernal forces. 65
Natural disasters continue to be described in language that
hearkens back to this religious history. For example, the phrase "act
of God" is routinely used in the law to describe natural disaster. 66

59. See, e.g., Russell R. Dynes, Noah and Disaster Planning: The Cultural Significance of the Flood
Story, 11 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 170, 171 (2003).
60. Anna Akasoy, Islamic Attitudes to Disasters in the Middle Ages: A Comparison of Earthquakes
and Plagues, 10 MEDIEVALHIST.J. 387, 392 (2007).
61. Id. at 390-91.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., David K. Chester & Angus M. Duncan, Responding to Disasters Within the
Christian Tradition, With Reference to Volcanic Eruptions and Earthquakes, 40 RELIGION 85, 86-87
(2010).
66. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (2006) (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (Clean Water Act); 15 U.S.C. §
1693h (Consumer Credit Protection Act); 19 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006) (Tariff Act of 1930).
Reinforcing the connection between divine interpretations of natural disasters and armed
conflict, federal statutes often address acts of God and acts of war together. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §
19jj-1 (2006) (limiting liability of individuals damaging national parks where the damage "was
caused solely by an act of God or an act of war); 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (limiting oil-pollution
liability if caused by an act of God or an act of war).
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Despite the reference to God, however, secular understandings of
natural disaster dominate the contemporary discourse in the United
States. As Ted Steinberg has richly detailed, by the end of the
nineteenth century, religious understandings of natural disasters had
fallen out of favor with the nation's elite, in no small part because
such a perspective was viewed as undermining economic recovery. 67
Steinberg suggests that natural disasters were rewritten, drained of
moral meaning, and dressed up in the clothing of nature, rather than
supernatural forces. 68 But this transformation did not fully embrace
scientific conceptions of natural events. Rather, powerful economic
and social forces mobilized to downplay the importance of disasters,
including dishonest reporters influenced by financers with stakes in
perpetuating booming development downplaying the effects of
natural hazards. 69 Following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, for
example, reporters recast the event as an out-of-control fire,
transforming a disaster arising out of the geological setting of the
city into one that could occur anywhere. 70 Similar efforts to
deemphasize natural disaster followed the 1926 hurricane that
struck Miami. The editor of the Miami Herald purportedly directed
his staff to divide damage assessments by ten in their reporting to
minimize concern about the dangers of living in the hurricane-prone
city. 71 Steinberg describes these efforts and many more as the
"politics of forgetfulness," whereby economic and political leaders
systematically attempted to distract from natural disaster to facilitate
development in hazard-prone areas. 72
Steinberg captures a sensibility that dominated much of the
twentieth century. Projecting safety and calm in the wake of disaster
allowed cities to continue with rapid development, and, indeed, the
desire to minimize the effects of disaster was so great that cities
would turn down offers of financial assistance. 73 Recent decades,
however, have witnessed a return to sensationalized accounts of

67. See TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD 5-22 (2000) (compiling historical documents related
to the Charleston earthquake of 1886 to demonstrate shift from religious to secular view of
disaster).
68. See id. at 4.
69. See id. at 33-46.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 55.
72. See id. at 201.
73. See id. at 58-59 (turning down assistance from the Red Cross).
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natural disasters, 74 perhaps as a result of increasingly available
information, which has made concealing natural hazards difficult, 75
and a belief that the federal treasury provides a seemingly
inexhaustible supply of recovery dollars. 76
The contemporary incarnation of the disaster narrative continues
to be predominantly secular.l 7 That is not to say that the religious
narrative has died out altogether. A 2011 survey conducted by the
Public Religion Research Institute found that a significant minority
of Americans believe that natural disasters are of divine origin. 78 The
majority of Americans, however, view disasters as natural events. 79

74. See, e.g., supra note 45.
75. Cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 10 (2001) (Discussing the potential of the
Internet to enhance human interaction and information sharing). As David Ropeik noted in the
wake of Superstorm Sandy, "[E]ven if you can avoid the traditional news, it's hard to escape the
social 'news' from the virtual world to which we are so connected. The flood of tweets and
Facebook posts about the storm further magnified the fear." David Ropeik, Superstorm Sandy
Reminds Us Why It's Easy to Underestimate Danger, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://articles. washingtonpost.com/2012-11-02/opinions/35503963 _1_ natural-disastersgenerators-chris-christie.
76. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since
1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 309-10 (Kenneth A. Froot, ed., 1999); see also
id. at 318 (describing "disaster relief' as looking "very much like an entitlement"). The federal
government's extensive expenditures on disaster relief likely fuel this belief. Between 2004 and
2011, the federal disaster relief fund, through which the Federal Emergency Management
Administration provides recovery assistance to state and local governments, spent an average of
approximately $10 billion a year. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DISASTER
ASSISTANCE: IMPROVED CRITERIA NEEDED TO ASSESS A jURISDICTION'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AND
RECOVER ON ITS OWN 2, 14 (2012), available at http://gao.gov/assets/650/648162.pdf.
77. The transformation from divine to scientific understandings of disaster is often traced
to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. See FARBER, ET AL, supra note 12, at 1; David K. Chester &
Angus M. Duncan, Responding to Disasters Within the Christian Tradition with Reference to Volcanic
Eruptions and Earthquakes, 40 RELIGION 85, 86 (2010). See generally john R. Mullin, The
Reconstruction of Lisbon Following the Earthquake of 1755: A Study in Despotic Planning, 7 PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 157 (1992) (discussing the earthquake and the reconstruction of Lisbon). As
Chester and Angus note, in many modern societies, including in the United States, religious and
scientific narratives often coexist. See Chester & Duncan, supra, at 89-90.
78. Few Americans See Earthquakes, Floods, and Other Natural Disasters a Sign from God, PuB.
RELIGION RES. !NST. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://publicreligion.org/research/ 2011/03/few-americanssee-earthquakes-floods-and-other-natural-disasters-a-sign-from-god-2/. Religious leaders have
also largely embraced understandings of disasters that find human activities significantly
culpable for loss. A 2000 study of Christian clergy in South Carolina reported similar results,
including, strikingly, that more than seventy-five percent of clergy indicated that most humans
have a significant ability to prevent losses in the face of natural disasters. See jerry T. Mitchell,
The Hazards of One's Faith: Hazard Perceptions of South Carolina Christina Clergy, 2 ENVTL. HAZARDS
25, 34 (2000).
79. Dispute over ascribing natural disaster to divine source broke out in the government
of Arkansas in 1997, with Governor and Baptist minister Mike Huckabee declaring that he
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Nonetheless, disasters are often described as "acts of nature" rather
than occurrences, according agency to natural forces and maintaining
the sense, even if not specifically voiced, that nature and humans are
involved in a conflict in which nature is an enemy that must be
resisted.
This cultural approach to disaster is reflected in and reinforced
by the mass media's approach to natural disaster, which relies
routinely on the metaphor of armed conflict as a source of evocative
language and catchy headlines. 80 Powerful storms "assault" and
"attack." 81 Nature acts with violence, 82 terrorizing, 83 and wreaking
havoc on the human world, 84 leaving in its wake areas resembling a
"post-apocalyptic warzone" 85 or "looking like they ha[ve] been hit by
a bomb." 86 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was
consistently described by on-the-ground observers as a "war zone." 87
In this war metaphor, nature is personified and made the enemy.

would not sign a disaster-assistance bill if it described tornadoes as "acts of God." See Mitchell,
supra note 78, at 25.
80. Quarantelli, supra note 6, at 31 (explaining that "the mass communication system is
by far the major source of 'information' about a disaster or a crisis" and that" [i]n major ways, it
socially constructs disasters and crises").
81. Seth Borenstein, et a!., Powerful Andrew Launches Assault on Louisiana's Coast, SOUTH
FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 1992, at A1; Cain Burdeau & Michael Kunzelman, Gulf Coast
Takes Beating from Slow-Moving Isaac, DENVER POST, Aug. 30, 2012, at 19A; Dennis Cauchon, eta!.,
Big Deals of 13: Problems We Welcome and Those We'd Rather Leave Behind, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2012,
at 1A; Joshua Schneyer & Selam Gebrekidan, Insight: Sandy Gives New York Oil Supply Lesson,
REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2012; Kelly Yamanouchi, Gas Prices; Storm Plays Role as Fuel Costs Rise, ATLANTA
jOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 30, 2012, at 1A.
82. See Linda Barron, Together Through Any Storm, BEAUREGARD DAILY NEWS, Jun. 16, 2012,
at 1; Mark Williams, Utilities No Match for Hurricanes, PRESS-REGISTER, Jan. 7, 2009, at F3.
83. C. Clark Hubbard, The New Year, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2012; Hurricane
Andrew, A 'Modern-Day Apocalypse', SOUTH FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (1992), http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/local/southflorida/sfl-1992-hurricane,O, 7825579 .story (last visited Sept. 11,
2012); Beth Kassab, Any Economic Bump Could Be Blown Away, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 2008,
at C1; Anthony R. Wood, Weather or Not: A History-Making Hurricane Year (Yes, This One), PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2007, at Dl.
84. Andrew Wreaks Havoc inS. Florida; Cost in Billions, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug 25, 1992,
at Al; james Quirk, eta!., Flood Victims Fed Up, N.J. RECORD, Oct. 9, 2011, at Al.
85. Action News at 11 (ABC television broadcast Dec. l, 2011), 2011 WLNR 25025533.
86. Hurricane Andrew (1992), S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (1992), http://www.sunsentinel.com/topic/disasters-accidents/meteorological-disasters/hurricanes/hurricane-andrew(l992)-EVHST000062.topic (last visited jan. 22, 2013).
87. See Tierney, supra note 51, at 71. The war-zone is a common metaphor for the site of
natural disaster. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the damage done to human development by natural events is
an expression of nature's "fury" or "capricious wrath." 88
Similar narratives of the almost-intelligent malevolence of nature
play themselves out in popular culture, particularly through disaster
movies like Dante's Peak, Twister, and The Day After Tomorrow. Indeed,
the history of the disaster-film genre suggests that the narrative
parallels it exhibits with war movies are hardly coincidental, but
rather, depiction of human versus nature grew up as "a generic
surrogate for war films" at a time when public popularity of imagery
associated with the Vietnam War declined. 89
The narrative of armed conflict has become even more resonant
in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Indeed, 9/11 has become
something of a benchmark against which other disasters are
measured. Consider, for example, a column by New York Times
columnist Paul Krugman explaining that "the failed response to
Katrina shows that we are less ready to cope with a terrorist attack
today than we were four years ago." 90 Or this, by columnist Frank
Rich:
[W]e cannot allow ourselves to forget the real history
surrounding 9/ll; it is the Rosetta stone for what is
happening now. If we are to pull ourselves out of the
disasters of Katrina and Iraq alike, we must live in the real
world, not the fantasyland of the administration's faithbased propaganda. 91

88. See, e.g., Steve Alexander, Simulating Nature's Wrath, When It Comes to Calculating
Disasters, Computer Simulations Aim to Measure the "Possible Risk of Ruin", STAR TRIBUNE, jul. 8, 2012,
at 03; joe Bastardi, Natural Cycles Trigger Extremes, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2012, at A6; Heather
Lake, Preparing for the Worst: Windham Eyes Emergency Micro-Grid Program, CHRONICLE (Williamatic,
Conn.), May 21, 2012, at 1.
89. Mauch, supra note 13, at 2.
90. Paul Krugman, Killed by Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A21. To give Krugman
his due, after setting up an equivalency between 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, Krugman does
note the crucial difference, stating that "disasters must be coped with, even if they aren't caused
by evildoers. Now we have another deadly lesson in why we need an effective government, and
why dedicated public servants deserve our respect. Will we listen?" Id.
91. Frank Rich, Falluja Floods the Superdome, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, Section 4 at 10; see
also Jamie Do ward, et a!., Aftermath of the Hurricane: America's Ordeal, OBSERVER (London), Sept. 4,
2005, at 15 ("[T]he disaster in New Orleans coming a week ahead of the fourth anniversary of
9/11, has a far wider national meaning than simply the Katrina catastrophe itself. Crucially it
calls into doubt Bush's electoral promise that he was the best candidate to protect the nation
from a terrorist attack.").
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A newspaper article running in the Chicago Tribune explained
that "even if the death toll from Katrina exceeds the roughly 3,000
fatalities from the 9/11 attacks, the obvious difference, initially, was
how frightenin~ and ominous 9/11 felt from border to border and
coast to coast." 2 Alternatively, consider this article in the New York
Times describing sympathy expressed by those who lost a loved one
in 9/11 for the victims of Hurricane Katrina:
There is suffering, and there is suffering. There is private
pain, and then there is the sort of pain that suddenly goes
public, that is broadcast to the nation . . . . It's a select
group. The 9/11 families belong to it, of course, as do
those who lost a loved one in the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing. Now the victims of Katrina, too, belong. 93

A column in the Savannah Morning News following Superstorm
Sandy sums up the sentiment, explaining that "Mother Nature can
be a terrorist like no other." 94
The power of the conflict imagery has not been lost on advocacy
groups. For example, an advertisement advocating for creation of a
federal insurance program for wind insurance read: "How do you
deal with an enemy that has no government, no money trail and no
qualms about killing women and children? The enemy is Mother
Nature." 95 This advertisement primes associations between natural
disaster and armed conflict, evoking events like war and terrorism,
with the obvious purpose of triggering a social response of resistance
to enemy incursion. Military advertising may further strengthen
these associations. National Guard recruitment efforts often mix
images of disaster response with images of armed conflict. 96

92. Eric Zorn, Katrina Shows We're Not Ready for Catastrophe, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2005, at
Metro 1; see also id. ("At first, the comparisons some drew between the 9/11 terrorist attacks and
the devastation left behind by Hurricane Katrina seemed glib and shallow.").
93. Alan Feuer, A Fellowship of Suffering, Ever Expanding, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/04/nyregion/thecity/04cope.html? _r=O (acknowledging the
connection publicly perceived between 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, saying "the public often
says: Don't forget. Don't forget the towers falling down. Don't forget the levees breaking open,"
and concludes that "New Orleans, like New York, will rise again").
94. Hubbard, supra note 83.
95. Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, at All.
96. See, e.g., National Guard, At This Moment, YouTUBE (Nov. 12, 2009),
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Political leaders draw on this language too. Consider this
statement by the mayor of Atlantic City following Superstorm Sandy:
"When Mother Nature sends her wrath your way, we're at her
mercy." 97 Or these statements made by President Barack Obama and
Mayor of New Orleans Mitch Landrieu in the hours before Hurricane
Isaac made landfall in Louisiana in August 2012. Mayor Landrieu
expressed the urgency of the situation by explaining, "We are officially
into the fight, and the city of New Orleans is now on the front
lines." 98 However, New Orleans was prepared. "We are battle-ready,"
reported the Mayor. 99 President Obama used similar language of
conflict to invoke national unity, stating, "[W]hen disaster strikes,
we're not Democrats or Republicans first, we are Americans first." 100
Similar rhetoric was used in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Testifying
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Blanco explicitly invoked feelings of patriotism tied up in
armed conflict in discussing Hurricane Katrina: "After World War II
our decision to rebuild Europe was farsighted and courageous. History
will treat us well if we exhibit the same kind of political courage
now." 101 And in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, a local government
official in Florida posed the question as television cameras rolled:
"Where in the hell is the cavalry?" 102

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbfpjOOpTNY; 3 Doors Down, Citizen Soldier, YouTuBE
(Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emm4VFvn2jg.
97. jacque Wilson, Victims Fall to Superstorm's Wrath, CNN (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www .cnn.com/20 12/1 0/31/us/superstorm-sandy-victi ms-profiles/index.html.
98. John Schwartz & Campbell Robertson, Hurricane Isaac Makes Landfall Along Gulf Coast,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/us/tropical-storm-isaac-onverge-of-becoming-a-category-1-hurricane.html?pagewanted =all.
99. Molly Hennessy-Piske & David Zucchino, Nervous Gulf Residents Brace for Gathering
Storm, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2012, at A7.
100. Schwartz & Robertson, supra note 98. President Obama offered similar comments in
the wake of Superstorm Sandy: "[W]hen disaster strikes, we see America at its best." Mary
Bruce, Obama Invokes Superstorm Sandy on the Campaign Trail, ABC NEWS (Nov. l, 2012),
http:/I abcnews.go.com/blogs/poli tics/20 12/1 1I obama -invokes-s u perstorm-sandy-on-thecampaign-trail/.
I 01. Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana: Hearing Before the
Select Bipartisan Comm. to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I 09th Cong.
2 (2005) (statement of Governor Kathleen Blanco).
I 02. Wayne Washington, Can FEMA Handle S.C. Hurricane? Candidates Vary on if Agency Should
Stay Part of Homeland Security, CoLUMBIA ST. (S.C.), Aug. 26, 2007, at B9. Describing those
assisting with disaster response as the cavalry, even if they have no relationship to the military,
is not uncommon. See Steffani Nolte, Progress Energy Crews Restore Power to North Carolina,
FLORENCE MORNING NEWS (S.C.), Aug. 29, 2011.
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The metaphor of natural event as attack is reinforced by the fact
that the domestic response to natural disaster closely parallels
responses to military action. Waiting for the "cavalry" evokes images
of battlefields and weary soldiers desperate for reinforcements.
Moreover, in the wake of natural disaster, local communities actually
await aid from the military. For example, members of the New York
National Guard's 101st Cavalry were activated to assist areas
damaged by Superstorm Sandy. 103 Thus, victims of Superstorm
Sandy were, quite literally, waiting for the "cavalry." The military
also has a prominent role in engineering efforts to stave off disaster.
The Army Corps of Engineers is primarily charged with construction
and maintenance of structural defenses to natural hazards. 104 And
emergency management agencies evolved out of civilian defense
groups designed to address threats of air raid during times of armed
conflict. 105 The vivid image of military convoys rushing to disaster
sites only reinforces the sense that we are, indeed, at war with
nature. 106
All of this talk of war, assault, and attack perpetuates
vulnerability to natural hazards by framing reconstruction as
necessary. In the aftermath of 9/11, the phrase "these colors don't
run" became a popular means of communicating America's
resolve. 107 Retaliation and reconstruction were seen as the only
available response to the terrorist attacks, else the terrorists would
have secured a victory over the American psyche. Natural disasters
trigger a similar response, a "knee-jerk reaction . . . to rebuild the
same roads and bridges that existed before and bigger, more
expensive homes." 108 Where a foreign agent-be it a foreign power

103. Richard Goldenberg, N.Y Mobilizes More than 2,300 Guardsmen to Battle Hurricane Sandy
Aftermath, DEF. DEP'T DOCUMENTS, Oct. 3, 2012. National Guard units from other states were
also deployed to respond to Superstorm Sandy. See National Guard Soldiers Activated for Sandy,
ARMY TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/10/ap-national-guardactivates-750-in-pa-for-sandy-102912/ (noting that Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia
activated more than 3,000 national guard soldiers to respond to Superstorm Sandy).
104. See, e.g., About Us, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil/
About.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
105. Quarantelli eta!., supra note 6, at 20.
106. See, e.g., Sun, Disaster Mythology, supra note 56, at 1133 (quoting CNN's Wolf Blitzer as
describing the arrival of National Guard troops in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina as
"eight convoys and troops are on the ground at last in a place being described as a lawless,
deadly war zone").
107. See Old Glory Gave Comfort to a Wounded Nation, Often Waved in Dissent or Disagreement, It
Gave Us Unity After Attacks, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Grand Rapids, Mich.), Sept. 11, 2011, at A16
108. Kate Spinner, Girding Nation for Weather Extremes, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota,
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or an overly proud fish-causes harm to the homeland, we respond
using a militaristic frame in which we must defend ourselves and
ultimately defeat the other. Such responses may be appropriate in
the case of terrorist attack or armed conflict, but they have no value
in the face of hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes that pay no
mind to society's actions. 109 Natural events do not intend to cause
destruction and terror. Proudly demonstrating a commitment to
rebuild in the same hazard-prone locations will not deter future
events. The rhetoric of conflict forecloses, or at least renders more
difficult, decisions to rebuild in more sensible, safer locations
because, in the narrative of armed conflict, such response represents
capitulation and retreat. 110
Ill. COGNITIVE OBSTACLES

The symbolic obstacles to reform discussed in the previous Part
synergize with aspects of human co?nition that systematically skew
public perception of disaster risk. 11 Even when science provides a

Fla.), Jan. 27, 2012, at Bl. Notably, that "communities, by and large . . . assume that they will
rebuild after disasters is a relatively recent development." james K. Mitchell, American Disasters
During the Twentieth Century: The Case of New jersey, in NATURAL DISASTERS, CULTURAL RESPONSES,
supra note 12, at 327, 337. In a detailed account of disaster history in New jersey-a state that
we rarely associate with natural disasters-Mitchell explains that numerous small communities
along the New jersey Coast and located in the fire-prone pine barrens have been abandoned.
Only in the last few decades have we become so enamored of structural approaches to disaster
mitigation that a presumption of reconstruction has arisen. !d. at 336-37.
109. Similarly, Professors Sun and Jones explain that restricting information may be
appropriate in some circumstances during wartime to prevent thinking enemies from exploiting
that information to the detriment of national security. See Sun & jones, supra note 58, at 15. But
this justification does not apply to natural disasters. Id. at 49.
110. Indeed, discussion of necessary migration of development away from coastlines to
reduce vulnerability to hurricanes and rising sea levels is typically phrased in terms of retreat.
See, e.g.,]. Peter Byrne & jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAw OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE 267 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). The very concept
of "recovery" as generally used today reinforces the notion that in the aftermath of disaster, the
only appropriate response is to rebuild. Take for example a relatively technical definition of
recovery provided in the sociological literature. Recovery is defined as "a community reaching
that point in its social and economic development that it would have reached had no disaster
occurred." Bates & Peacock, supra note 54, at 302; see also id. at 326 (explaining that most
disaster assistance in the United States "has the aim of restoring the system to its former
condition"). However, so defining recovery stacks the deck. It means that we can only recover by
rebuilding. Recovery, under that definition, does not include decisions not to rebuild but rather
to integrate affected communities into others in less hazard-prone areas.
111. This section focuses on the ways that cognition skews perceptions of probabilities
that risks will manifest. It does not, therefore, address cognitive processes that favor instant
gratification over longer-term benefits. See Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1035 ("Human beings
naturally discount the temporally and physically distant because of the apparent lack of direct
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reasonably certain prediction about the likelihood of disaster, the
human brain may unreasonably discount that risk. The perception
that reconstruction isn't risky reinforces the intuition that rebuilding
is a symbolic necessity. This Part explores cognitive errors that may
skew perceptions of natural hazards and thereby directly affect not
only policymakers' interest in reducing vulnerability but also the
public demand for such action.
In recent decades, psychologists have uncovered numerous ways
that cognition leads to seemingly irrational decision making. 112
Processes of so-called "bounded rationality" lead to systematic skew
in thinking that can have profound implications for law. 113 The
human brain has trouble conceptualizing probabilistic events,
particularly those with low frequency and high severity. 114 This
problem becomes extreme as probabilities approach zero. As a form
of mental shortcut, in some circumstances the mind perceives very
low probabilities as impossibilities. So, for example, scholars
investigating insurance markets have suggested that this mental
shortcut may account for widespread underinvestment in insurance
to protect against very-low-probability events, particularly natural
disasters. 115 Similarly, viewing low risks as zero risks may lead

relevancy to their own lives."). I do not mean to suggest, however, that public perceptions of
risk are unimportant to public policy. Risk perception may be "irrationally" skewed by
discounting. See id. It may also be more responsive to those effects of disaster that are hard to
quantify, such as psychological responses of victims or even those physically unaffected. As Paul
Slavic explained, "'riskiness' means more to people than 'expected number of fatalities."' Paul
Slavic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 285 (1987). But see Frank B. Cross, Facts and Values in
Risk Assessment, 59 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 27, 27 (1998) (arguing that "the
public's risk perception is pervasively infected by ignorance or illegitimate value judgments").
Scientific estimates of the probabilities of floods, blizzards, earthquakes and the like are also
subject to a degree of social construction because, in most cases, the data require interpretation.
See Tom Horlick-jones, Meaning and Contextualization in Risk Assessment, 59 ENGINEERING & SYS.
SAFETY 79, 81 (1998). But in the context of natural disasters at least, predictions about
periodicity have a real-world check because, over time, a certain number of disasters will strike
any particular area. This Part addresses the cognitive obstacles to accurately comprehending the
likelihood of natural disasters.
I 12. For general treatments of the psychology of bounded rationality, see HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE jUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovch et a!. eds., 2002); jUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman eta!. eds., l 982).
I 13. See Christine jolls eta!., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
147I, 1477-78 (1998); see also john Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 j. ECON. LiTERATURE
669, 669-70 (1996).

114. See, e.g., Christine jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 ]. LEGAL STUD.
199, 208-09 (2006).
I IS. See, e.g., Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 22, at 1 I; Howard Kunreuther eta!., Making
Low Probabilities Useful, 23 ]. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103 (2001); Paul Slavic et a!., Preference for
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individuals to make economically irrational decisions about where
and how to build.
Consider how this cognitive error could affect someone owning
property in a five-hundred-year flood plain. Such a risk might be
sufficiently low that decisions about development will be made with
no thought to flood risk, even if construction is economically
marginal and would not be cost justified if the risk of loss were taken
into account. This error also may infect government decisions, which
are often made with little consideration for low likelihood events.
Flood-control dams are rarely built to withstand five-hundred-year
flood events and the NFIP does not include any minimum design
standards for buildings subject to such risks. 116 In some
circumstances, of course, these decisions are economically rational
based on the risks, but in others, risks may simply be neglected. This
is true despite the fact that a flood that occurs on average every 500
years has a one percent chance to occur every five years, and a ten
percent chance to occur every fifty years. And such floods have
produced significant damage, as the residents of Duluth, Minnesota,
discovered in June of 2012, where a five-hundred-year flood caused
more than $100 million in damage. 117 Because individuals and
policymakers perceive risks likely to actualize an average of once
every five hundred years as risk-free, they may overlook cost-justified
mitigation efforts.
Other cognitive processes distort perceptions of natural hazards
even when they are perceived. These rare events may be subject to
two competing cognitive errors that lead to systematic devaluation of
risk. The first, the gambler's fallacy, biases estimation of risks in the
immediate aftermath of disaster. The gambler's fallacy causes people
to believe that an unlikely event that has recently occurred is less

Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS., 237, 254-55 (1977).
But see Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability Losses, 39]. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
17 (2009) (presenting data from an experiment indicating that "individuals are more likely to
purchase insurance for the higher-consequence, lower-probability events").
116. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,988, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,951 § 6(b) (May 24, 1977) (defining
"base flood" for purposes of NFIP as a "flood which has a one percent or greater chance of
occurrence in any given year"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-!25, MIDWEST
FLOOD: INFORMATION ON THE PERFORMANCE, EFFECTS, AND CONTROL OF LEVEES 2-3 (!995)
(noting that a "typical" federal flood control levee protects against a "100-year flood," while nonfederal levees often provide lesser protection).
117. See Jennifer Brooks, Special Session Set for August on Flood Relief, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) Quly
12, 20 12), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/16214 7585.html?refer=y.
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likely to recur in the near future. 118 The gambler's fallacy is basically
the belief that lightning doesn't strike the same place twice. 119 The
gambler's fallacy, then, leads individuals and government entities to
overinvest in reconstruction in the wake of disaster based on a
mistaken assumption that a period of repose and relative safety will
follow.
Interviews with those struck by multiple disasters bear out the
operation of the gambler's fallacy. In upstate New York, a business
executive for a company that had built a large commercial facility in
a floodplain damaged in Hurricane Irene explained that since
flooding had recently occurred, "[w]e thought we had a hundred
years." 120 Similarly, a Louisiana property owner explained his
decision to rebuild saying "something like [Hurricane] Katrina
happens only once in a hundred years. . . . By that time, I'll be
dead." 121 As a Florida resident explained, "I never had a problem.
Then came [a hurricane]. Afterward, I said it wouldn't happen
twice." 122 Similarly, in repeated flooding of the Susquehanna River
in 2006 and 2011, one local resident explained that he believed the
2006 event had been a "once-in-a-lifetime flood" and another
emphasized that "you don't expect it two times in five years." 123
This type of thinking can lead people to invest heavily in the wake of
disaster. 124

118. See Stephen P. Stitch & Richard E. Nisbett, justification and the Psychology of Human
Reasoning, 47 PHIL. Sci. 188, 192-93 (1980) (explaining the gambler's fallacy); see also Tristram
McPherson, Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism, 3 ]. ETHICS & Soc. PHIL. 2, 20 (2009)
("Ordinary reasoners display robust endorsement of irrational inference patterns such as the
gambler's fallacy.").
119. The idiom fails to even accurately describe the behavior of lightning. See MythBusters:
Lightning Strikes Twice (Discovery Channel television broadcast Apr. 5, 2011), available at
http://dsc.discovery.com/tv-shows/mythbusters/videos/lightning-strikes-twice-minimyth.htm.
120. Semple, supra note 31.
121. Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Repeats Mistakes as it Rebuilds: Many Houses Built in Areas
Katrina Flooded Are Not on Raised Foundations, WASH. PosT Oan. 4, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/03/
AR2007010301593.html.
122. Tyler Bridges, Victims Are Stunned by Ferocity of Storm, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6, 2000, at
B2.
123. Sarah Hofius Hall et a!., Flood Victims Recount Their Experiences, TIMES-TRIBUNE
(Scranton, Pa.) (Sept. 10, 2011), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/flood-victims-recount-theirexperiences-1.1201023.
124. For example, following 2006 flooding of a post office, a couple purchased the building
to live in and invested substantial money and energy in custom design. The home was then
destroyed in Hurricane Irene. See Josh Mrozinski, In Hard-Hit Neighborhoods, Rebuilding Begins,

238

213

Deconstructing Disaster

The gambler's fallacy depresses estimation of risk in the
immediate aftermath of disaster, but as time passes and memories of
the aftermath fade, a second cognitive error may kick in and continue
to skew risk perceptions. 125 Specifically, the availability heuristic
may replace the gambler's fallacy, leading to a similar result. The
availability heuristic leads people to assess the likelihood that
something will occur based on the ease with which an example of it
comes to mind. 126 Over time, the experience of disaster will come to
mind less easily, leading to assumptions of relative safety and
causing people to make decisions as though the natural hazards no
longer existed. When disaster strikes again, people express surprise
and shock at the ending of a long period of calm. 127 As an
experienced insurance adjuster put it, "Wherever it's been a long
time since the last hurricane . . . people become complacent." 128
Another version of the availability heuristic may also be at work.
People typically believe that others make rational decisions, and
observing others living and working in hazard-prone areas may lead
to assumptions about safety. 129 In other words, observing others
TIMES-TRIBUNE (Pa.)
(Sept. 3, 2011), http:!/thetimes-tribune.com/news/in-hard-hitneighborhoods-rebuilding-begins-1.1197 435.
125. The results of this cognitive error may vary between individuals. For some, the
availability heuristic may drown out the gambler's fallacy, particularly where a natural disaster
has had unusually powerful affects. Spikes in insurance purchasing in the wake of certain
disasters suggest that particularly in the very short term, property owners may have heightened
perceptions of risk. For example, between September 30, 2011 and August 31, 2012, the number
of NFIP policies purchased in Vermont grew by about sixteen percent. See National Flood Insurance
Program: Total Number of Policies in Force, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Mar. 2012),
http://www.fema.gov/policy-claim-statistics-flood-insurance/policy-claim-statistics-floodinsurance/policy-claim-13-2 (follow "Total Number of Policies in Force" hyperlink) (identifying
3,719 policies in Vermont as of September 30, 2011); National Flood Insurance Program: Policy
Statistics, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm (last
visited jan. 13, 2013) (identifying 4,327 policies in force as of August 31, 2012). As a result,
"availability and salience [may] create short-term spikes in demand immediately after a horrific
natural disaster, but, as the vividness of the event recedes, the gambler's fallacy kicks in to
depress demand for insurance." See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 33 n. 123.
126. See Christine Jolls et a!., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1477-78 (1998) (explaining the availability heuristic).
127. Hurricane Irene was the worst storm in Vermont since 1927. See Matt Sutkoski, The
Power of Water, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 2011, at 01. Of course, it should come as no
surprise that one-hundred-year flooding occurs twice in the span of ninety years.
128. Susan R.A. Honeyman, When Uncommon Storms Make a Surprise Visit, ROUGH NOTES,
May
I,
2012,
at
66,
available
at
http://www.roughnotes.com/rnmagazine/2012/
may2012/2012_05p066.htm.
129. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
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living and working in hazard-prone areas provides readily available
examples that appear to suggest that risks are low. Similarly, people
often overestimate the effectiveness of mitigation measures. 130
Because cognition depends in part on observation of the behavior of
others, cognitive errors can compound, causing whole communities
to adopt false understandings of disaster risk based on assumptions
about the beliefs of others. 131
This dynamic can be particularly strong when public-works
projects designed to reduce hazards are involved. 132 For example,
people overestimate the protection afforded by dikes designed to
protect against floods, and this is particularly so when others live
and work in the shadow of those projects. This hard lesson has been
taught repeatedly. The Central Valley of California is a particularly
dramatic example. Before the construction of dams, the valley was
subject to dramatic flooding. 133 After dams were constructed,
residential and commercial development swiftly dominated the
landscape to such an extent that "new homeowners have little
notion that they live in a floodplain." 134 But dams can only contain
so much water, and in 1997 more than 185 homes were flooded
when the Tuolumne River jumped its heavily engineered banks. 135
Hurricane Katrina also taught the lesson of engineering increasing
vulnerability in even more dramatic fashion. 136

L. REV. 683,710-12 (1999) (discussing social framing of risk perception).
130. The National Hurricane Center, for example, instructs people not to tape their
windows before a hurricane because it "leads to a false sense of security." Mike Schneider, Don't
Tape Your Windows Before a Hurricane, Officials Say, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 28, 2012, at A3. As
David Ropeik aptly described in the Washington Post following Superstorm Sandy, "The more
control over a risk you think you have, the less worrisome it feels, no matter how false that
sense of control might be." David Ropeik, Superstorm Sandy Reminds Us Why It's Easy to
Underestimate Danger, WASH. PosT (Nov. 2, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1102/opinions/3 5503 963 _l_ natural-disasters-generators-chris-christie.
131. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 711.
132. Raymond Burby has termed this the "safe development paradox," whereby efforts to
enhance safety result in increased vulnerability to natural hazards. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra
note 22, at 173-78.
133. See DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA
CHALLENGE-FLOODING
IN
THE
CENTRAL
VALLEY
iii
(2007),
available
at
http://www. water.ca.govI news/newsreleases/2008/l 01507 challenge.pdf.
134. See Elliot Diringer & Ramon G. McLeod, Floods Warn Valley of Worse to Come I Storms,
Growth Expose Region's Rising Risk, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at AI.
135. Id.
136. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS HURRICANE KATRINA EXTERNAL REVIEW
PANEL, THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 61-
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The cogmtlve errors this Article has been discussing skew
perceptions of risk at both the individual and socio-political level.
This occurs because these errors influence policymakers individually
and also shape the public's appetite for regulation. Where the
electorate believes development is relatively risk free, they are likely
to oppose regulation that will increase the cost of development. 137
Moreover, sophisticated parties can harness cogmt1ve
phenomena to advance their political agenda. Timur Kuran and Cass
Sunstein have identified "availability entrepreneurs" leveraging
cogmtlve errors in the context of political debates about
technological risks. 138 Kuran and Sunstein identify circumstances
where advocates for restrictive policies have highlighted or even
invented risks to trigger the availability heuristic. 139 Similarly,
availability entrepreneurs with vested interests in relaxed
development policies may emphasize, as part of their advocacy,
examples of development in hazard-prone areas that have not
experienced catastrophic losses. In so doing, examples of "safe"
development may more easily come to mind, causing people to
overestimate safety.
In addition to the cognitive phenomena discussed above, the very
fact that people perceive natural disasters as natural may lead to an
underappreciation of risk. In experimental settings, individuals
express a substantially greater degree of concern about artificial risks
than natural risks, even when the risks are of the same
magnitude. 140 So, people assume they are relatively safe in the face
of flood risk, even as they demand swift political action in response
to artificial hazardous substances like those detected at Love
Canal. 141
63 (2007), available at http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/ASCE _News/2009/
04_April/ERPreport.pdf (explaining that lack of quantification of risks related to New Orleans
hurricane protection system meant that "residents ... could not have known the actual risks
with which they were living"); Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 176.
137. As Cass Sunstein has explained, "If citizens believe that they have much to gain and
little to lose from risk regulation, they will favor risk regulation; leaders should be expected to
respond to what citizens believe, and their own judgments are influenced by an intuitive kind of
cost-benefit analysis as well." Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and
Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 524 (2007).
138. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 687-88.
139. Id.
140. See W. Kip Viscusi, Carcinogen Regulation: Risk Characteristics and the Synthetic Risk Bias,
85 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 53-54 (1995).
141. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 129, at 697-98.
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A final cognitive error that may affect risk perceptions is known
as the "affect heuristic," which causes emotion to influence
cognition, and particularly judgments about risk. The operation of
the affect heuristic skews risk perception based on emotional
attachment. 142 So, for example, people tend to perceive things they
like as being low risk and things they don't like as being high risk. 143
This may lead to erroneous correlation of risks and benefits, whereby
that which is beneficial is perceived as being safe and vice versa. 144
The problem is, of course, that risks and benefits are not always
correlated, and this may be particularly true in the context of
development. Property subject to high natural hazards may also have
amenities that make it particularly attractive for residential or
commercial development. For example, ocean front property is both
highly desired for its aesthetic attributes and also high risk. The
affect heuristic may lead people to discount risks when they have
emotional attachment to a particular piece of property. In other
words, a potential homebuyer who forms a rapid emotional
attachment to a house will be susceptible to overestimating the
house's safety.
The symbolism of reconstruction addressed in Part II may itself
activate the affect heuristic. The rhetoric of armed conflict creates
social pressure to rebuild as a symbol of resistance and resolve and
to avoid the appearance of surrender. Thus, policies favoring swift
reconstruction activate positive emotions, while those disfavoring
such activities activate negative emotions. Through the affect
heuristic, these emotional responses become part of the public
perception of natural hazard risk. Redevelopment, then, is not only
culturally imperative but is also perceived as a relatively safe
decision.
Assessment of redevelopment in the wake of disaster is,
therefore, vulnerable to a range of cognitive errors. Coupled with the
symbolic factors affecting risk perception, these factors often militate
in favor of development even where such development is "irrational"
in the market sense that risks outweigh benefits. This does not
mean, of course, that all decisions to build in the face of natural

142. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 ].
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 2 (2000).

143. See id.
144. See id. at 13.
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hazards are irrational. Indeed, as we shall see in Part IV, the
structure of American political institutions separates the costs of
disaster from the benefits of development and consequently creates a
situation where, from the private landowner's or local government
official's perspective, overinvestment in development is often highly
advantageous.
IV. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
Parts II and III have explained that the cultural and cogmtrve
context of disaster policy is hostile to restrictive development
policies. As a result of that context, people invest more heavily in
hazard-prone areas than common sense or economic reality
supports, and government officials resist regulation. Effective
disaster policy also faces obstacles from the very structure of the
government institutions charged with its promulgation and
effectuation. Some of these problems arise from relationships unique
to the American constitutional experience and the principles of
federalism it embodies. Others are inherent in the democratic
structures of government more generally. These obstacles create
substantial incentives for private individuals and government
officials to facilitate development in hazard-prone areas.
The first structural obstacle arises from vertical relationships
between local, state, and federal governments and their respective
responsibilities for natural disaster policy. 145 To understand those
relationships, consider Brattleboro, Vermont, a town that lies at the
confluence of the West River and the much larger Connecticut
River. 146 Based on flood maps prepared in 1977, the town contains
approximately 1000 acres in one-hundred-year floodplains. 147 The

145. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of
Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 104 (2006). Dispersal of authority across federal, state,
and local governments also has substantial ramifications for rescue efforts, law enforcement, and
humanitarian response in the wake of natural disaster. See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Stop
Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. ]OHN's]. LEGAL COMMENT. 527
(2006).
146. See Map of the Town of Brattleboro, VT., MAPSONL!NE.NET, http://www.mapsonline.net/b
rattleborovt/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
147. See Brattleboro, Vermont Town Plan Map Series: Flood Hazard Areas, BRATTLEBORO.ORG,
http://www. brattleboro.org/vertical/sites/% 7BF60ASDSE-ACSC-4F97 -891A615C 172A5783% 7D/uploads/% 7BDC196E51-1 FDA-4CD9-B71A-4A4FDFCOF03D%7D.PDF
(last visited Oct. 27, 2012); 1 TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, BRATTLEBORO TOWN PLAN 121 (2004),
available
at
http://www. brattleboro.org/vertical/sites/% 7BFABA8FB3-EBD9-4E2C-91 F9-
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Brattleboro zoning laws largely control land use and development
within the town, and to a large extent, the town's policies dictate the
extent of its vulnerability to flooding. 148 Brattleboro's zoning code
generally prohibits construction within stream channels
themselves, 149 but allows new development in floodplains so long as
minimum building standards are met. 150 These standards, while
locally adopted and enforced, largely reflect the minimum standards
that the federal government requires for NFIP eligibility. 151
This is a pretty typical arrangement. Land-use planning and
regulation of property have long been viewed as central functions of
local government. That allocation has been consistently endorsed by
the Supreme Court and featured in an 1868 Supreme Court decision,
Swift v. Tyson. 152 Swift famously held that federal courts could
generally interfret the common law without regard to decisions of
state courts. 15 Swift concomitantly held that the federal courts had
no independent authority over the "rights and titles to things having
a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and
other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and
character." 154 The commitment to generally-although not
absolutely-entrust land-use decisions to state and local
governments has persisted. In 2008, a plurality decision of the
Supreme Court echoed the views expressed in Swift. As Justice Scalia
wrote, " [r] egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and
local power." 155
The federal government tinkers with land-use planning at the
margins through the NFIP and laws like the Coastal Zone

C74DE6CECDFD%7D/uploads/Ch_lO_Natural_Resources.pdf. Flood maps of this vintage are
common but recognized to substantially underestimate risks. See, e.g., supra note 26 (discussing
the failure ofNFIP to maintain up-to-date flood maps).
148. See generally TOWN OF BRATILEBORO, VT., ZONING ORDINANCE art. Ill,§ 3210 Quly 3,
2007).
149. Id. § 3257(d).
150. See id. § 3255.
151. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM COMMUNITY ENROLLMENT AND
ELIGIBILITY HANDBOOK, supra note 36.
152. 41 U.S. I, 8-9 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80
(1938). Even before Erie largely ended the project of federal common law, federal courts had
already recognized exclusive state control over the law of property, including land use. See id. at
18-19.
153. Id. at 9-10.
154. Id. at 18.
155. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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Management Act and Coastal Barrier Resources Act, which create
incentives for local governments to restrict or at least regulate
development. 156 On its face, section 404 of the Clean Water Act also
appears to have substantial implications for flood risk by requiring
parties seeking to fill wetlands to secure permits from the federal
government. 157 But regulations that implement the act render this
tool ineffective because they require the Army Corps of Engineers to
defer to land-use and zoning decisions made by state and local
government. 158 The Corps implementation of those regulations has
been even more favorable to local views. As Oliver Houck has
explained, for example, robust political opposition in Louisiana to
any effort to limit wetlands development resulted in a culture at the
Corps that automatically approved virtually every request for a
permit to fill wetlands. 159
The local government, then, decides whether to allow
development to occur in high-hazard areas, a decision that may
significantly increase the severity of the natural hazard itself. Local
governments also exert substantial control over how development
occurs through building codes, which can require construction
practices designed to protect against hazards. 160

156. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006); Coastal Barrier
Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (2006). Unfortunately, the federal minimum standards
may become the default in many jurisdictions, leading local government officials to question the
wisdom of creating obstacles to development that are not required by federal law. See, e.g.,
BRA ITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, MAY 15TH MEETING MINUTES 3 (2007), available at
http://bit.ly/BrattleboroMinutes ("Tim Cuthbertson asked why we were putting in a more
stringent standard that is not strictly required. We are putting in obstacles for new development
and should not be mandated."). For an analysis of the CZMA suggesting that it has caused little
change in the development practices in states hostile to restrictive land use, see Oliver A. Houck,
Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New Orleans and the Gulf Cost South and How It Might
Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1073-76 (2007).
157. 33 u.s.c. § 1344 (2006).
158. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(j) (2) (2011).
159. Houck, supra note 156, at 1069-73. As Houck explained: "At a time [the early 1980s]
when, nationally, Corps permit denials averaged two percent, the New Orleans district was
averaging one-tenth of one percent. Clearly, this was a district and a region with a different
attitude about protecting wetlands." Id. at 1071.
160. See, e.g., New York City Building Code, Appendix G § G303.7(1) (2011) (prohibiting
grading and fill in flood hazard areas "[u]nless such fill is placed, compacted and sloped to
minimize shifting, slumping and erosion during the rise and fall of flood water and, as
action"),
available
at
http://publicecodes.cyberregs.com/st/ny/ciapplicable,
wave
nyc/b200v08/index.htm?bu= YC-P-2008-000006; City of South Pasedena Florida Building Code
§ 108-18(A) ("All new construction and substantial improvements shall be anchored to prevent
flotation,
collapse
or
lateral
movement
of
the
structure."),
available
at
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Problems arise because local governments have significant
incentives to underregulate, allowing development to occur where it
should not and using insufficiently protective practices. 161 Local
governments typically receive much or all of their funding from
property taxes, meaning that more development means more tax
dollars and the ability to provide more services to residents.
Increasingly, local governments fund public projects based on
sophisticated financing instruments that turn projected increases in
tax revenue into present dollars. 162 This practice, called "tax
increment financing," only increases the pressure on local
governments to maximize development.
On the other side of the ledger, local governments pay relatively
little of the costs of disaster, which are largely displaced to the
federal government. The federal government has long been in the
business of ftroviding financial and technical assistance in the wake
of disasters, 63 and this role has only increased over time. 164 Once a
federal disaster is declared, which occurs with increasing
frequency, 165 the Stafford Act authorizes payment from the federal
treasury to reimburse seventy-five percent or more of the costs local
governments pay to rebuild public infrastructure, 166 and local
governments often receive a higher percentage.
This is precisely what occurred in Vermont following Hurricane
Irene. FEMA authorized reimbursement of ninety percent of the cost

http://www.ecode360.com/714 7993.
161. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 178-81.
162. See George Lefcoe, Competing for the Next Hundred Million Americans: The Uses and Abuses
of Tax Increment Financing, 43 URB. LAw. 427 (20 11). Lisa Grow Sun provides a careful description
of the redevelopment of the Portland, Oregon, waterfront as an example of public funds,
including over a hundred million in tax increment financing, increasing hazard risk. Sun, Smart
Growth, supra note 30, at 2189-90. If serious flooding destroys or severely damages the new
development, Portland would have considerable incentive to secure state or federal disaster
assistance to enable reconstruction to minimize shortfalls in projected tax revenue already
dedicated to future bond payments.
163. See Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried By Fire"': Disaster Relief and the Origins
of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 967 (1998).
164. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE: IMPROVED
CRITERIA NEEDED TO ASSESS AjURISDICTION'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AND RECOVER ON ITS OWN,
supra note 76, at 9-11 ; see also id. at 29-30 (noting that the current methodology for declaring a
federal disaster does not accurately account for the ability of state and local governments to
adequately respond).
165. See Thomas Frank, 'Disasters' StrainFEMA's Resources, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2011, at AI.
166. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 51215207 (2006).
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of repairs 167 and reported providing $18 million to the state of
Vermont and its municipalities by the end of 2011. 168 On top of the
federal funding, the state agreed to reimburse local governments for
all remaining costs that exceeded the revenue that would be
generated by a three-cent tax increase. 169 In Brattleboro, a town that
has an annual revenue of over $14 million and that sustained
substantial damage, this translated into a maximum direct cost to
the town of about $340,000. 170
The finances of local governments are, of course, influenced by
more than just direct outlays for repair of public infrastructure.
Property values may fall in the wake of a natural disaster, particularly
if residents or business owners incur high recovery costs
themselves. 171 The financial wellbeing of those residing within a
jurisdiction affects overall economic health. And, of course,
democratically elected leaders must be responsive to local concerns.
Local governments receive only mute forms of those signals,
however, because individuals suffering losses from disaster also
receive substantial subsidies. 172 The federal government provides
167. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE No. 4022~080, FEMA WILL GIVE
VERMONT 90 PERCENT FUNDING FOR IRENE REPAIR WORK (2012), available at
http://www .fema.gov/news-release/fema-will-give-vermon t -90-percent-funding-irene-repairwork.
168. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE NO. 4022~072, MORE THAN $72 MILLION
IN DISASTER AID SUPPLIED TO VERMONT IN 2011 (2011) (hereinafter Dec. 2011 FEMA Report],
available at http://www. fema.gov/news-release/more-72-million-disaster -aid-supplied-vermont2011.
169. See Memorandum from Sue Minter, Irene Recovery Officer, to Municipal Officials
Involved in Irene Recovery Quly 11, 2012), available at http://www.trorc.org/pdf/
irene/FEMA %20updates%20for%20PA %20July%2020 12.pdf.
170. !d.; TOWN OF BRATTLEBORO, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2011), available at
http://brattleborovtrebuild.govoffice.com/vertical/Sites/% 7BFABA8FB3-EBD9-4E2C-91 F9C74DE6CECDFD%7D/uploads/Town~Report~2011~FINAL1 (l).pdf. A report produced by the
U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that Windham County, which contains Brattleboro,
will eventually receive $35 million in public assistance. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VERMONT
DR-4022,
ECONOMIC
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
7
(2012),
available
at
http://vtstrong. vermont.gov/Portals/0/Documents/V ermont~Econ ~Impact~Final %20%2042312.pdf.
171. Where individual property owners bear the cost of recovery the market should
internalize that cost as a liability attached to the property, thereby reducing the property's
relative value. Cf David Ariosto, First Irene, Then Sandy: jersey City Recovers, Again, CNN WIRE
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/us/new-jersey-irene-sandy/index.html
(quoting jersey City resident as saying "[t]he more this flooding happens . . . the lower
property values wiJI sink" (ellipses in original)).
172. As will be discussed, significant federal resources are available to home and business
owners in the wake of a natural disaster. The Stafford Act does require, however, some
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direct financial assistance in the form of individual grants and loans
and block grants provided to state and local governments for
recovery projects. In the wake of Irene, the federal government
provided $22.7 million in grants and $17.6 million in low-interest
loans to homeowners and renters, 173 $19 million in loans to
businesses, 174 and over $20 million in such community development
block grants. 175 All told, the federal government is expected to pick
up seventy-five percent of the total $733 million cost of recovering
from Irene. 176 Beyond the federal funds, local governments typically
receive further subsidies from the state. The state of Vermont, for
example, offered to reimburse towns that received reduced property
taxes in the wake of Irene and also agreed to pay certain costs of
infrastructure repairs not covered by the federal government. 177
Natural disasters' costs are not only shifted to the federal and
state governments, but such events also generate substantial
charitable donations, making additional funds available to those that
live and work in areas affected by natural disasters. This charity
homeowners that have previously received disaster relief to purchase flood insurance to remain
eligible for future disaster relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 5154a(a) (2006).
173. See Wilson Ring, Vt Irene Recovery Bill at $733M, More Work to Do, VT. TODAY Qune 15,
20 12), http://vermonttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20 120615/NEWS03/706159860;
Southeastern Vermont Irene Long Term Recovery Committee, WINDHAM COUNTY VT STATUS INFO. (Nov.
15, 2011), http://www.windhamstatus.org/2011/11/15/southeastern-vermont-irene-long-termrecovery-committee. FEMA reports that it provided more than $23.1 million in aid to individuals
and families and $31.2 million in low-interest disaster loans to small businesses. See Dec. 2011
FEMA Report, supra note 168. These figures do not include additional funds provided in 2012.
174. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RELEASE No. 4022-073, FEDERAL AID FOR IRENE,
SPRING 2011 FLOODING TOPS $100 MILLION IN VERMONT (2012), available at
http://www .fema.gov/news-release/federal-aid-irene-spring-20 11-fl ooding-tops-1 DO-millionvermont; see also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FACT SHEET-DISASTER LOANS: VERMONT DECLARATION
#12784
&
#12785
(2011),
available
at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
VT%2012784%20Fact%20Sheet%20TS%201rene%20Amend%205%20adds%203%20cos%20915-11_l.pdf; Irene Disaster Loan Deadline is june 1, TIMES ARGUS (May 14, 2012),
http://timesargus .com/artide/20 120514/B USINESS03/705149993/1 006/BUSINESS.
175. See The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community Development
Block
Grant
Disaster
Recovery
Funding
(CDBG-DR),
I
AM
VT.
STRONG,
http://vtstrong.vermont.gov/Home/StateRecovery/HUDCommunityDevelopmentBlockGrant.as
px (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
176. See Ring, supra note 173.
177. See Peter Hirschfeld, Winners and Losers as Legislature Closes Session, VT. TODAY (May 6,
2012), http://www .vermonttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll!artide?AID=/20120506/NEWS03/7050
69821/-1/NEBJ; Peter Hirschfeld, House Approves Tax Relief for Irene-Ravage Towns and Cities, VT.
PRESS BUREAU Qan. 5, 2012), http://www.vermontpressbureau.com/house-approves-tax-relieffor-irene-ravage-towns-and-cities; Irene and jobs, a Record of Results, VERMONT (May 5, 2012),
http:/I governor. vermont. govIn ewsroom-irene-and-jobs-a-record -of-results.
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comes in many forms, from large-scale organizational efforts to
celebrity concerts. 178 These funds are, in part, used to provide
services to displaced individuals, but money is often made available
to rebuild homes and businesses. 179 This, in turn, further reduces
the amount of the cost of recovery borne directly either by the
individuals living and working in areas subject to natural hazards or
the local governments that govern these areas.
All of these sources of funding substantially dampen financial
signals to local governments to responsibly manage development in
areas subject to natural hazards. Local government officials have the
luxury of adhering to the view that the "free market" should drive
development because neither the local government, nor its residents,
will face the full costs of making foolish choices. 180
That natural disaster aid distorts public policy is not to suggest
that it should be stopped altogether. In my view, social policy should
encourage an ethic of helping others that have lost their homes and
businesses in natural disasters. Catastrophic moments can also build
international goodwill and feelings of unity that benefit society.
While engaged in response activities in Vermont following Hurricane
Irene, one National Guard veteran said, "This is the proudest I've
been [about] anything I've been involved in-being able to help out
our neighbors in a time of need." 181 At the same time, it is worth
considering the reasons that social and charitable resources are
channeled to those afflicted by events that we term "natural"
disasters rather than more generally to those in need. That society
chooses to provide financial compensation to those harmed by

178. Grace Potter Concerts Raise $300,000 for Flood Relief, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Oct. 22,
2011, at W7; see also Students Hold Penny Drive to Save Covered Bridges, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS, Oct. 22, 2011, at W12; Hallenbeck, supra note 43; Bob Audette, More Irene Money Coming
to
Windham
County,
CLASSIC
HITS
92.7
WKVT
Quly
21,
2012),
http://wkvt.com/20 12/07/20/More-Irene·money-coming-to-Windham-County/13 777730.
179. See, e.g., Kimberly Drelich, Kellogg Raises $50,000 for Marine Businesses Harmed by Sandy,
THE DAY (New London, Conn.) (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/
20121229/NWS0!/312299976/-l/zip06. In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the Robinhood
Foundation provided more than $17 million to relief organizations including those dedicated to
repairing
and
rebuilding
homes
and
businesses.
See
ROBIN
HOOD,
http://www.robinhood.org/rhsandy (last visited jan. 14, 2013).
180. See Baird Helgeson, Risky Rebuilding, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 5, 2006, at 1. In the wake of
Hurricane Ivan, the mayor of Pensacola, hard hit by the storm, opposed any restrictions on
development, suggesting instead that the "free market drives [development], the way it should
be." Id.; see also PIDOT, supra note 18, at 37.
181. Hallenbeck, supra note 43, at Al.

249

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

floods, hurricanes, and other natural events, but is generally more
reluctant to aid those harmed by events perceived as human caused,
may largely be a result of the social construction of natural disasters
as being caused by nature. 182 Moreover, the fact that a natural
disaster is an event may distract attention away from the desperate
poverty and needs that many of our most vulnerable citizens
experience on an ongoing basis.
In addition to distortions caused by vertical divisions of authority
between local, state, and federal governments, the relationship
between neighboring local jurisdictions impedes sensible
development. This horizontal allocation of natural disaster policy
vests land-use decisions in local governments whose borders do not
neatly map onto geographic features that dictate natural hazards. 183
Because natural boundaries often span political boundaries, the
benefits and costs of one jurisdiction's development policies may be
displaced onto neighboring jurisdictions.
Flood risk is a quintessential example. Development within a
watershed influences the likelihood and severity of flooding by
increasing runoff and reducing natural capacity to absorb high water.
In other words, one town's decision to allow disturbance of natural
floodplains within its borders may well lead to increased flooding
within the borders of lower elevation towns. Moreover, towns in
close proximity to each other often compete for commercial and
residential development in an effort to channel funding streams into
their jurisdiction. This dynamic has the potential to lead to a classic
race to the bottom. Local governments may feel pressure to allow
land to remain deregulated to attract business, particularly because
they fear that the decisions of neighboring towns may undo any
effort to curb vulnerability that they attempt. This concern is not just
hypothetical. For example, during deliberations by the Brattleboro

182. As Professor Michelle Landis Dauber has argued, differentiation between losses due
to "natural" causes and human causes makes little sense from the perspective of those suffering
losses. See Landis, supra note 163, at 995. In a vivid example of this from early in American
history, Daubert contrasts the dramatic losses suffered by a sea captain whose valor led to the
capture and criminal trial of would-be pirates with those of individuals whose homes burned in a
city-wide fire in Arlington, Virginia. !d. at 967-69.
183. The vertical and horizontal relationships discussed here are different than the
horizontal and vertical political externalities that Ben Depoorter has identified as arising from
disaster management. See Depoorter, supra note 144, at 108-10. This Article discusses the
relationship between government entities, while Depoorter examined the relationship between
political actors and their constituents.
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Selectboard on a proposal to limit new impermeable surfaces within
floodplains, the concern was raised that the forestry practices of
surrounding towns contributed to flooding and would undermine
the new policy. 184
Misalignment of political and natural boundaries extends beyond
just the relationship of towns. Many natural systems span state and
national boundaries, further complicating the policy picture. For
example, the Connecticut River, which flooded along significant
portions of its length in Hurricane Irene, 185 finds its source in
Fourth Connecticut Lake in New Hampshire, flows south along the
border between Vermont and New Hampshire, and enters
Massachusetts and eventually Connecticut. Its watershed also
extends well into Canada. The policy choices of each state and
neighboring Canadian provinces work in combination to affect flood
risks along the river's entire length. 186
Both the vertical and horizontal dynamics described arise roughly
from economic externalities. The policy choices of local governments
resulting in increased vulnerability to natural hazards impose
considerable costs, but neither the local governments themselves,
nor their constituents, fully bear those costs. Instead, these costs are
displaced onto state and federal taxpayers, donors, and the residents
of neighboring jurisdictions. Put another way, the decision of local
government officials to enact sensible policies to control
development in areas subject to natural hazards creates some
benefits felt beyond their borders, which benefits local government
officials cannot capture and, therefore, have little incentive to
pursue.
Beyond these problems, which we might consider economic in
nature, disaster policy also presents a prime opportunity for

184. See, e.g., BRAITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, APRIL 17 MEETING MINUTES 2 (2007), available at
http://bit.ly/BrattleboroMinutes; BRAITLEBORO SELECTBOARD, APRIL 17TH MINUTES 2 (2007),
available
at
http://www. brattleboro.org!vertical/Sites/o/o 7BF60ASDSE-ACSC-4F97 -891A615Cl72A5783%7D/uploads/%7B04ASBE4C-AAFC-4ESE-8512-4790A373738Bo/o7D.PDF.
185. See Jim Kinney, Hurricane Irene Still Swelling Rivers; Connecticut Yet to Crest in Holyoke,
Springfield, REPUBLICAN (Springfield, Mass.), Aug. 29, 2011.
186. The great rivers of the western United States span jurisdictions too numerous to list
and have resulted in complex international treaties between the United States, Mexico, and
Canada to govern flood control projects and the allocation of water. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens,

Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Backdrop for Natural Resource Management: Flood Management in the
Columbia River Basin, 42 ENvrL. L. 241, 243 (2012).
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government capture. 187 That is because the cost of bad policy is both
broadly distributed (to federal taxpayers, for example) and
unpredictable, while the benefits of bad policy are highly
concentrated in a few highly organized and well-funded industries.
Public choice theory suggests that in such circumstances,
policymakers disproportionately favor the interests of the few, even
if doing so undermines social welfare. 188 This means that even
where ample information about disaster risk exists, there may be "no
politically powerful constituency ready to support legislators and
agency officials" advocating for policies to reduce disaster
vulnerability. 189 Moreover, disaster policy may be particularly subject
to government capture because of the symbolic and cognitive
obstacles discussed above. The public misperceives risk and
overvalues reconstruction as a signal of societal resolve. 190 As a
result, even where regulation would enhance social welfare, the
public may provide little or no counterbalance to the significant
influence wielded by the development community.
Return again to the debate in Brattleboro about restricting
development in floodplains. The public debate consistently
referenced concerns about restricting development, and the
development community generated opposition. 191 This same
dynamic plays itself out around the country and on the national
stage. In California, for example, the development community has
fiercely opposed development restrictions in floodplains in the
central valley, where more than 750,000 people already live in

187. Government capture refers to the often-documented phenomenon whereby a highlymotivated interest group can disproportionately influence-in other words, "capture"government policy. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
2353, 2362 (2007); john S. Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713,724 (1986).
188. See, e.g., Depoorter, supra note 145, at 108-09; see also ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING
CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 54-56 (2010); see also
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 892
(1987) (discussing origins of the public choice economics account of legislation).
189. Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1045.
190. See discussion supra Parts II, III.
191. Bob Audette, Board Nixes Erosion Hazard Regulation, BRATTLEBORO REFORMER
(Brattleboro, Vt.), jan. 20, 2010; joel B. Baird, Brook's Rage Cuts Off Brattleboro Residents,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.), Aug. 30, 2011, at B4; see also Michael Grunwald,
Wetlands Protection Rules Due; Army Corps Would Slow Development, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 2000, at
AI; Spencer Hunt, Groups Object to Big Darby Plan; Builders and Landowners Tell State that Proposed
Protections Go Too Far, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Columbus, Ohio), Mar. 22, 2006, at Cl.
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floodplains. 192 In Birmingham, Alabama, soon after forming an
advocacy organization, business and development interests
successfully scuttled plans to substantially curtail development in
the floodplain of Five Mile Creek, which had flooded in 2003 causing
a billion dollars in damage. 193 And in Brevard County, Florida, a
large development company lobbied for looser development
restrictions within the ten-year floodplain. 194 Indeed, developers
have even opposed requirements to notify potential buyers that
property lies within a twenty-five-year floodplain. 195 The political
advocacy of the development industry makes sense since building in
areas subject to natural hazards and, indeed, responding to natural
events generates substantial revenue. 196 Economic losses, on the
other hand, are paid out by the federal treasury and, therefore,
policies to reduce those losses lack a concentrated constituency.
Other political dynamics also impede effective disaster policy.
Natural hazards are probabilistic and require long planning horizons,
while elected officials tend to have a short-time horizon calibrated to
achieve reelection. From the perspective of an elected official, gains
likely to occur during their term in office are more valuable than
losses that will accrue outside of that time period. 197 So, for
example, politicians may be more sensitive to an immediate influx of
tax dollars than to the greater social costs that may not actualize
until decades in the future. Disaster policy may also fail to get on the
agenda of policymakers because other issues, such as school funding,
192. Elliot Diringer & Ramon G. McLeod, Floods Warn Valley of Worse to Come: Storms,
Growth Expose Region's Rising Risk, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1997, at Al.
193. See jeff Hansen, New Business Alliance Flexes Its Muscles to Get Its Way; Foes Accuse BARD of
Putting Its Desires Above Community's, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), Dec. 10, 2006, at 1.
194. County Delays Wetlands Changes, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne, Fla.),june 3, 2010, at Bl.
195. See Brian Haas, New Homes Plan Passes, BRADENTON HERALD (Bradenton, Fla.), Aug. 9,
2002, at Cl.
196. Insurance companies are an interesting case. They make money off of providing a
hedge against risk but also face steep losses when natural disasters strike. This dichotomy
incentivizes the company to reduce vulnerability-either by declining to offer insurance or
reducing the risks faced by the properties they insure-or find other sources of financing to lay
off some of their risk. In recent years, the federal treasury has been an attractive target and there
has been a concerted, although as of yet unsuccessful, effort to secure passage of legislation to
create federal multi-peril insurance. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 48-49; Gene Taylor, Federal
Insurance Reform After Katrina, 77 MISS. L.J. 783, 790 (2008). The business of transacting
insurance claims has its own constituency. See Russell Grantham, Hitting the Road After
Catastrophe, ATLANTA).-CONST., Sept. 4, 2011, at 01.
197. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 847 (2012).
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have more immediate

V. CONCLUSION
I have focused on obstacles to sensible disaster policy and they
present something of a grim picture. The language we use, the
political systems we rely upon, and even the way that we think
thwart efforts to regulate behavior in response to natural hazards
and result in ever-increasing vulnerability. And these obstacles often
interact, creating a policy landscape particularly hostile to reform.
The interactions between and among the three obstacles take
many forms. The discourse of disaster causes people to view
positively efforts to rebuild because within the metaphor of armed
conflict, rebuilding means defying the efforts of the enemy and
failing to rebuild means retreat. The positive emotion this
symbolism vests in reconstruction may, in turn, trigger the affect
heuristic, resulting in exaggerated belief about the safety of
rebuilding in hazardous locations.
Cognitive errors simultaneously feed back into the symbolic
value placed on rebuilding in the wake of disaster. People
systematically underappreciate the degree of risk of building in areas
subject to natural hazards, making reconstruction appear relatively
risk free. In other words, people perceive victory over nature as
relatively easy to achieve because cognitive biases make natural
hazards appear less dangerous. Where victory appears cheap, courses
of action that lead to perceived defeat will be treated as particularly
suspect.
These cognitive and symbolic obstacles reinforce the perverse
incentives created by the allocation of governmental authority over
disaster policy. Local government officials do not only have political
incentives not to restrict development, but those incentives are
buttressed by their own cognition and the skepticism of the public
driven by the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of natural disaster.
And, as we have seen, government officials often draw on the armed
conflict metaphor, reinforcing the symbolic value attached to
reconstruction in the wake of natural disaster.

198. See MILETI, supra note 16, at 160.
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Recent history bears out the power of these dynamics. Economic
losses attributed to natural disasters double every decade, and there
is no end in sight. 199 Transforming coastlines, riverbanks, and
mountain forests into houses and storefronts also disturbs fragile
and important ecosystems, which once provided natural protection
against disaster. 200
Still, hope remains. The enormity of economic loss is becoming
too big to ignore, particularly at a time of increasing scrutiny on
government spending. The time may finally be ripe for reform.
However, enacting, implementing, and persisting with sensible
approaches to natural disasters will require a coordinated approach
that takes account of the suite of obstacles discussed in this Article.
None of these obstacles is insurmountable. New institutional
arrangements can realign regulatory authority and financial
responsibility. 201 This could take the form of increasing federal
responsibility for land-use decisions in hazardous areas. The Army
Corps of Engineers could play this role, at least in part, through
existing authority under the Clean Water Act. Alternatively, local
governments could assume increasing financial responsibility for
recovery, creating incentives for better land-use regulation. Local
governments could also enter into collaborative partnerships with
one another to better coordinate development across jurisdictional
lines. 202 Or, states could step in, playing a larger role in both
planning for natural disasters and paying their price.
Law that generates public information about disaster risk-for
example, by providing updated, publicly available, and highly visible
flood maps or requiring sellers to disclose natural hazard risks to
would-be purchasers of property-may debias, at least to some
extent, perceptions of risk. In some circumstances, insurance
premiums that correctly reflect risk may serve this role. The cost of
insurance can focus the mind, making concrete probabilistic risks
that might otherwise be overlooked. 203 At the same time, insurance

199. See FARBER, ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
200. See VERCHICK, supra note 188, at 11-24. Robert Verchick suggests that we think of
natural conditions that provide services, including disaster-prevention or mitigation services,
such as "green infrastructure," so that they will not get overlooked in development planning. !d.
201. See Burby, Paradoxes, supra note 22, at 181-86; Hudson, supra note 25, at 1998-99;
Lazarus, supra note 41, at 1046-53.
202. See Hudson, supra note 25, at 2057-60.
203. See PIDOT, supra note 18, at 47. The requirement that owners of homes in one-
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markets do not provide a panacea because they are subject to many
of the same dynamics this Article has discussed. During the debate
surrounding reauthorization of the NFIP, virtually everyone agreed
that premiums offered through the program should be "actuarial." 204
But as often, proponents of government insurance programs call for
"affordability," and actuarially sound rates for buildings subject to
high risks will often be unaffordable. 205 Recent legislation made
some improvements to the NFIP: phasing out explicit subsidies,
allowing updated flood maps that reflect land-use decisions, and
considering a longer time frame for determining average losses. 206 In
the future, the program could be further modified to front-load
payments so that developers themselves feel the squeeze, and this
could more effectively calibrate development decisions to the risk of
natural hazards.
Political leaders should also consider the language they use in
discussing disaster. Invoking the metaphor of war can prime a
demand for reckless reconstruction without regard for the likelihood
of future losses. Emphasizing the human role in creating
circumstances in which natural events can lead to devastation may
facilitate more rational development policy.
For decades, America has pursued a reckless path of building in
areas threatened by severe risks from inevitable natural disasters.
When disaster has struck, America has rebuilt, setting itself up for

hundred-year floodplains acquire flood insurance to secure federally insured mortgages assists
with this price-signaling effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l) (2006). Many individuals subject to
this legal requirement nonetheless remain uninsured, and the NFIP has struggled to increase the
number of other homeowners that purchase flood insurance. See LLOYD DIXON, ET AL., THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM'S MARKET PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS, at xvi-xvii (2006).
204. See generally PIDOT, supra note 18.
205. See PJDOT, supra note 18, at 15. In one celebrated case, the owner of a Houston-area
home valued at $115,000 received over $806,000 in insurance payments over eighteen years due
to sixteen flooding events. See Francesca Ortiz, The Tide is Nigh: Rethinking Urban Flood Management,
9 CHAP. L. REV. 435, 448 (2006). Risks of this magnitude and frequency may be insurable
because it is possible to predict the likelihood of an insured event occurring and the amount of
loss. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO.
L.J. 783, 813 (2005). But an actuarially-adjusted premium would likely be unaffordable. That
would not be a function of the insurance market failing, however, but rather of an irrational
decision to develop on such disaster-prone property.
206. See jESSICA GRANNIS, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR, ANALYSIS OF HOW THE FLOOD
INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF 2012 (H.R. 4348) MAY AFFECT STATE AND LOCAL ADAPTATION
EFFORTS (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/
Analysis%20ofo/o20the%20Fiood%20Insurance%20Reform%20Act%20ofo/o202012.pdf.
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another round of destruction. As the president of a real estate firm in
New York explained in the wake of Superstorm Sandy, "[I]f history
teaches us anything, people always rebuild and they always come
back." 207 Fortunately, some government officials and private
individuals are beginning to ask the right questions. After
Superstorm Sandy, the opinion pages of leading newspapers
broadcast the message that the time has come to rethink our
approach to building-and rebuilding-in hazard-prone places. 208 In
the wake of Hurricane Irene, a report published by the Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources posed similar questions: "[W]hat will
we learn from Irene's impacts, knowing that severe flooding may
continue to become more common? How can we rebuild
intelligently, incorporating greater flood resiliency in our
commumnes while protecting our natural environment?" 209 Such
inquiry is far from the norm, and the suite of obstacles one must
confront in facing disaster policy discussed in this Article have
historically overcome common sense. But if the nation can
successfully grapple with these questions and overcome the
obstacles to disaster policy, the next hurricane may simply be a
notable weather event and not a natural disaster.

207. Ariosto, supra note 4.
208. See, e.g., James D. Fraser, et a!., We're Too Close to the Sea, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 2012;
Margaret Hartley, Effects of Sandy Should Impel Us to Try to Tread Carefully, DAILY GAZETTE (Albany,
N.Y.), Nov. 4, 2012, at E10; Roger K. Lewis, Heeding the Cruel Housing Lessons of Hurricane Sandy,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2012; Norbet P. Psuty, The Data Is ln. Now We Need Action, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 2012.
209. See Sacha Pealer, Lessons from Irene: Building Resiliency as We Rebuild, VT. AGENCY OF NAT.
REs. Qan. 4, 2012), http://www.anr.state.vt.us/anr/climatechange/Pubs/lrene_Facts.pdf.
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